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PROLOGUE  
The subtitle of this Article, “Something Old; Something New,” 
has taken on additional significance since the October 2014 
symposium at which it was presented. In the intervening months, the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) did an 
abrupt about-face in the direction taken by its Open Internet rules—
from a standards-based approach using the Commission’s § 706 
authority1 to a rules-based approach premised on reclassification of 
Internet Access as a “telecommunications service” subject to its Title 
II authority.2 The editors have graciously allowed those of us writing 
on net neutrality to substantively update our contributions.3  
The original version of this Article, which was based primarily 
on comments that I submitted to the FCC even earlier, in July 2014, 
had argued that the standards-based approach proposed in the May 
2014 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)4 was sound—and 
indeed, was necessary.5 The Commission disagreed. In February 
2015, it adopted its new Open Internet rules, adopting the rules-
based approach premised on reclassification of “Broadband Internet 
                                                     
 1. See Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, ¶ 77, at 17,947 
(2010). 
 2. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 1120110, ¶¶ 47-
50, at *13-14 (2015). 
 3. Indeed, the legal landscape around the Open Internet Order has 
continued to develop in important ways in the few weeks since this article was last 
substantively revised. Perhaps most important, in King v. Burwell, the Supreme 
Court once again took a skeptical approach to agency action relating to matters of 
“deep ‘economic and political significance,’” continuing a recent trend central to 
this Article’s argument. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (citing Util. 
Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)). As developed in this 
Article, the Court’s 2014 opinion in Utility Air Regulatory Group raises serious 
questions about the Open Internet Order – the recent opinion in Burwell amplifies 
the seriousness of this concern. For further development of this argument, see Brief 
for International Center for Law & Economics and Administrative Law Scholars et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 
No. 15-1063 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2015), available at http://laweconcenter.org/ 
images/articles/icle_oio_amicus_filed.pdf. This brief, filed in support of challengers 
to the Open Internet Order and of which I was a primary author, builds on the 
arguments developed at greater length in this article.  
 4. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, ¶¶ 
116-41, at 5602-10 (2014). 
 5. See generally JUSTIN (GUS) HURWITZ, COMMENTS ON PROTECTING AND 
PROMOTING THE OPEN INTERNET (2014), available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/ 
document/view?id=7521706505. 
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Access Service” (BIAS) under Title II.6 As such, the tone and 
structure of this Article must change. Following a stage-setting 
discussion, it now starts with “something new”—key elements of the 
already pending challenges that the FCC faces as its Order moves 
through Federal Court.7 It then turns back the dial to explain why a 
standards-based approach is both an appropriate and necessary 
approach to net neutrality regulation. This structure provides a “one-
two” punch, first explaining why the Commission’s current rules are 
likely to be rejected by the courts, and then explaining why the basic 
concept of the rules is flawed.  
INTRODUCTION  
Net neutrality—like this symposium—is about the importance 
of innovation. Proponents of network neutrality regulation argue that 
openness and neutrality are principles that have defined the Internet 
architecture and that have made it a fertile platform for innovation.8 
Indeed, this is the basic motivation for the FCC Open Internet 
efforts.9  
The challenge for the FCC has been finding statutory basis for 
taking action based on what is a policy goal. The FCC’s statutory 
mandate is to regulate the various communications industries in the 
United States—telephone, broadcast radio and television, cable and 
other multi-channel television, and satellite. The FCC’s statutory 
mandate is not to promote innovation or to set national innovation 
policy. It is perhaps unsurprising then that the Commission has 
struggled to find legal basis for its net neutrality efforts. This has 
been particularly difficult for the Commission since it has 
historically disavowed its most direct source of regulatory authority, 
                                                     
 6. 2015 WL 1120110, ¶¶ 14-25, at *5-8. 
 7. At least 10 challenges to the Open Internet Order have been filed in 
federal circuit courts. All of these challenges have subsequently been consolidated 
before the D.C. Circuit with oral arguments scheduled for December 4, 2015. United 
States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, No. 15-1063 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2015). 
 8. Net Neutrality: What You Need to Know, SAVE THE INTERNET, 
http://www.savetheinternet.com/net-neutrality-what-you-need-know-now (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
 9. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, ¶ 
25, at 5570 (2014). “Open Internet” and net neutrality are synonymous and used 
interchangeably in this Article. Open Internet is the terminology adopted by the FCC 
to describe network neutrality. Id. at 5649 (statement of Mignon L. Clyburn, 
Comm’r).  
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Title II of the Communications Act.10 Title II gives the Commission 
pervasive authority to regulate “telecommunications services.”11 But 
the Commission has, until adopting its recent Open Internet Order, 
classified Internet Access as an “information service”12—and 
information services are regulated under Title I of the 
Communications Act, which gives the Commission much less 
regulatory authority.13  
Short of reclassifying Internet access as a Title II service, over 
the past many years the Commission has developed an alternative 
theory of regulation under Title I. Section 706 of the 
Communications Act required the Commission to ensure the 
deployment of advanced telecommunications capabilities, which it 
has determined includes Internet service.14 The basic regulatory 
theory of the Commission’s Open Internet rules—which the FCC has 
used to justify regulation under § 706 and to motivate regulation 
under Title II—is that net neutrality promotes innovation on the 
Internet, which in turn may promote new products and services that 
increase consumer demand for Internet services.15 In response, 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) will expand and upgrade their 
networks (i.e., deploy advanced telecommunications capabilities) to 
meet this demand. The FCC refers to this theory in which innovation 
drives demand drives supply as the “virtuous circle” of innovation.16  
But this virtuous circle can turn both ways: Many innovations 
may be better enabled—or even require—non-neutrality; and 
neutrality may foreclose some forms of innovation. Whether 
neutrality or non-neutrality better promotes innovation is an 
empirical question. More important, it is a fact-specific question. 
Some innovation likely benefits more from one than the other, and 
conversely. Any Open Internet regulation must be careful not to 
protect only one at the expense of the other. 
The basic argument that I present is that the Commission 
should not adopt comprehensive Open Internet rules but rather 
                                                     
 10. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and 
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); see infra Section II.A.  
 11. See 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, ¶ 95, at 4847-48. 
 12. Id. ¶ 38, at 4822. 
 13. Id. ¶ 95, at 4847-48. 
 14. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012). 
 15. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, ¶ 25, at 
5570 (2014). 
 16. See id. ¶¶ 26-27, at 5570-71. 
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should promulgate general guidelines to provide notice to industry 
participants (be they consumers, last-mile or backbone carriers, or 
edge providers) about the general classes of conduct of concern to 
the Commission. Should subsequent conduct raise concerns under 
these guidelines, the Commission should take strong and swift 
enforcement action, proceeding on a case-by-case basis under its 
§ 706 authority. 
This approach, which is captured in the “commercially 
reasonable” standard proposed in the Commission’s 2014 NPRM,17 
is grounded in modern principles of administrative law and 
procedure; is sufficient to protect consumers and police potentially 
problematic behavior; and is pragmatic both in that it is less likely to 
result in further years of Open Internet rulemaking efforts (and 
concomitant uncertainty) than other alternatives being considered by 
the Commission and in that it is more likely to survive judicial 
challenge than those alternatives. It allows for the continued 
development of new pro-consumer businesses and business models 
on the Internet while allowing the Commission to investigate and 
take action against conduct that may harm consumers—in this sense 
it is unlike other alternatives under consideration that could foreclose 
the development of pro-consumer businesses and business models in 
the interest of preventing hypothetical (and often nonsensical) 
consumer harm. This approach maintains flexibility that is essential 
to avoid manipulation, capture, and arbitrage by firms that would use 
the Commission’s rules to profit, possibly at the expense of 
consumers. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a general, 
brief overview of the Commission’s latest iteration of the Open 
Internet Order. This overview is not meant to be comprehensive—at 
over 300 pages, excluding Commissioner statements, that is not 
possible in a short article. Rather, it provides an overview of the 
general contours and identifies specific issues important to the rest of 
this Article.  
Part II jumps straight to judicial challenges to the Order. 
Organizationally, this discussion will draw from issues discussed in 
Part III, and logically follows that discussion. However, given the 
pendency of judicial challenges to the Order, this discussion 
demands primary placement. Not all possible challenges are 
discussed. Rather, the focus is on challenges that are important either 
for their broader precedential importance or because they directly 
                                                     
 17. Id. ¶¶ 116-120, at 5602-03. 
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challenge the premises of the Open Internet order. To wit, this 
discussion considers arguments that the Commission lacks statutory 
authority to adopt regulations that broadly affect the Internet 
(important in the Chevron (especially “Step Zero”),18 Brown & 
Williamson,19 City of Arlington,20 and Utility Air Regulatory Group21 
line of cases); that reclassification requires more substantial fact-
finding to overcome the Commission’s prior classification of Internet 
access as a Title I service (important in the State Farm22 and Fox I23 
line of cases); and that the Order is arbitrary and capricious because 
it failed to consider important record evidence suggesting that non-
neutrality is not necessarily harmful and can be beneficial. This last 
point calls into question the FCC’s entire Open Internet endeavor.  
Part III turns to the various fields of research relevant to the 
Open Internet Order to understand whether its motivating concerns 
actually justify regulatory intervention. The literature in these fields 
is robust and consistently leads to the same result: Neutrality can, in 
some cases, be beneficial to consumers, and in other cases, harmful; 
and conversely, non-neutrality can, in some cases, be harmful to 
consumers, and in other cases, beneficial.24 In particular, this 
discussion looks to the literatures on the economics of vertical 
integration, openness and innovation, and multi-sided markets, as 
well as the operational characteristics of the Internet (statistical 
multiplexing and packet switching). And it explains that concern that 
“paid prioritization” necessarily creates “fast lanes” is 
technologically wrong and is based on misunderstandings of how the 
Internet works. Indeed, it is entirely possible that paid prioritization 
of some traffic can increase performance of other traffic for purely 
technical reasons. Any rule, therefore, that prophylactically mandates 
or forecloses the adoption of broad classes of business structures or 
conduct is, almost by definition, arbitrary, and its adoption 
capricious. A conclusion follows.  
                                                     
 18. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 19. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
 20. City of Arlington, Texas v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
 21. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
 22. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. 
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 23. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (Fox I). 
 24. See infra Part III. 
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I. THE OPEN INTERNET ORDER 
Before discussing the various judicial, economic, technical, and 
other challenges facing the Commission’s Open Internet Order, the 
contours of the Order should be put on the table. The discussion 
below provides a brief history of the order; an overview of the 
Order’s statutory basis; and an overview of the Order’s substance. 
This discussion is limited to the factors necessary for the subsequent 
discussions.  
A. A Brief History of the Order 
The Commission’s latest Open Internet Order has been more 
than a decade in the making—and fits into themes the Commission 
has been dealing with since at least its first Computer Inquiry,25 
Carterfone,26 and Hush-a-Phone27 orders. The modern history of the 
issue started with academic work,28 which gave rise to the 
Commission’s 2005 Internet Policy Statement.29 The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected the Commission’s effort to enforce the 
Internet Policy Statement in the 2010 Comcast case on the grounds 
that the Commission lacked statutory authority to police the 
Internet.30 This decision resulted from the Commission’s prior 
determinations that Internet Access was an Information Service 
subject to Title I of the Communications Act, as opposed to a 
Telecommunications Service subject to Title II;31 and that § 706 of 
                                                     
 25. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of 
Computer and Communication Services and Facilities (Computer Inquiry), 29 
F.C.C.2d 162 (1971). 
 26. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service 
(Carterfone), 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). 
 27. Hush-A-Phone Corporation and Harry C. Tuttle, Complainants v. 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company, et al., Defendants (Hush-a-Phone), 
23 F.C.C. 405 (1957) . 
 28. See, e.g., Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. 
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
 29. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005). 
 30. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 31. Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and 
Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, ¶ 38, at 4822 (2002); see also Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976, 991-92 (2005).  
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the Telecommunications Act32 did not grant the Commission 
affirmative regulatory authority.33 
In response to its loss in Comcast, the Commission undertook a 
rulemaking to both issue binding Open Internet rules—as opposed to 
a mere policy statement—and also to reevaluate its prior 
determination that § 706 is not an affirmative grant of regulatory 
authority applicable to the Internet. This rulemaking culminated in 
the 2010 Open Internet Order.34 Importantly, this Order was released 
following the Supreme Court’s holding in Fox I, which reaffirmed 
and clarified that agencies are broadly free to alter their prior 
statutory interpretations so long as any new interpretation is an 
otherwise permissible interpretation.35  
The 2010 Order was again challenged, this time by Verizon. In 
January 2014, the D.C. Circuit issued its decision in Verizon, again 
rejecting the bulk of the Order.36 In specific, the D.C. Circuit rejected 
the Commission’s “No Blocking” and “No Unreasonable 
Discrimination” rules, holding the Commission and effectively 
subjected providers of Title I Information Services to common-
carriage requirements37—contrary to the Communications Act’s 
requirement that only providers of Title II Telecommunications 
Services be treated as common carriers.38 However, the D.C. Circuit 
expressly upheld the Commission’s re-interpretation of § 706 as 
conferring affirmative regulatory authority applicable to the 
Internet.39 And the court drew on another of its recent cases involving 
the Commission, Cellco, in a way that strongly suggested that the 
Commission’s Order would be upheld were it modified to apply a 
“commercially reasonable” standard, as opposed to a common 
carrier-like standard, to the No Blocking and No Unreasonable 
Discrimination rules.40 
In the months immediately following the Verizon decision, 
FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler began the process of issuing new Open 
                                                     
 32. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012). 
 33. Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24,012, ¶ 69, at 24,044-45 (1998). 
 34. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 (2010). 
 35. Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009). 
 36. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 655-59 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 37. Id. at 655, 658-59 (holding that the 2010 Open Internet Order imposed 
common-carriage obligations). 
 38. Id. at 650 (“We think it obvious that the Commission would violate the 
Communications Act were it to regulate broadband providers as common carriers.”). 
 39. Id. at 635 (affirming the Commission’s new reading of § 706). 
 40. Id. at 657 (providing a roadmap). 
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Internet rules.41 The initial tack taken was to follow the D.C. 
Circuit’s roadmap—re-implement the prior rules based on a 
“commercially reasonable” standard.42 In May 2014, the Commission 
issued an NPRM for proposed rules taking this approach.43 The 
NPRM requested views on alternate approaches, including brief 
discussion of reclassifying Internet access from Title I to Title II—
though it did not propose rules based upon such approaches. 
Over the following nine months, the Commission received 
approximately four million comments in the rulemaking proceeding; 
it also held various roundtable-style workshops, and Commission 
officials conducted a substantial number of ex parte meetings with 
various stakeholders and other interested parties.44 While the 
Commission has yet to release the totality or comprehensive 
summary of the 4 million comments received, it appears that a 
majority of them advocated reclassifying Internet access as a Title II 
service—but a substantial minority advocated that the FCC leave the 
Internet classified as a less-regulated Title I Information Service. 
Importantly, the vast majority of comments on both sides were 
driven by advocacy groups45—indeed, there is a strong argument that 
the vast majority of these comments were advocating positions that 
could not reasonably be attributed to those submitting them (e.g., 
few, if any, non-telecom lawyers could be expected to have a 
sophisticated enough understanding of the relevant law to 
                                                     
 41. See, e.g., STATEMENT BY FCC CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER ON THE FCC’S 
OPEN INTERNET RULES, FCC (Feb. 19, 2014), available at https://www.fcc.gov/ 
document/statement-fcc-chairman-tom-wheeler-fccs-open-internet-rules; 
STATEMENT BY FCC CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER REGARDING DC CIRCUIT OPINION, 
FCC (Jan. 14, 2014), available at https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-wheeler-
statement-court-opinion-open-internet-rules. 
 42. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, ¶¶ 
116-41, at 5602-10 (2014). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 1120110, ¶¶ 47-
6, at *3 (2015).  
 45. Advocacy spending on both sides of the net neutrality debate has been 
substantial. See, e.g., Josh Peterson & Yaël Ossowski, Ford Foundation Pours 
Millions into Net Neutrality to Guarantee Billion-Dollar Investments, 
WATCHDOG.ORG (Dec. 15, 2014), http://watchdog.org/187392/ford-foundation 
(“Between 2007-2014, the Ford Foundation dropped $46 million in support of pro-
net neutrality organizations . . . . That would put the Ford Foundation’s contribution 
to the net neutrality lobbying effort not far behind that of all major 
telecommunications firms combined . . . .”); Amy Schatz, One Million Net 
Neutrality Comments vs. $42 Million in ISP Lobbying, RE/CODE (July 22, 2014, 
12:02 PM), http://recode.net/2014/07/22/one-million-net-neutrality-comments-vs-
42-million-in-isp-lobbying. 
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meaningfully argue for “Title I” vs. “Title II” classification—yet a 
substantial portion of comments used such terminology).  
Despite strong advocacy efforts by proponents of reclassifying 
Internet access as a Title II service, as of late fall 2014, it appeared 
that the Commission was going to hold to the proposal advanced in 
the NPRM and articulated by the D.C. Circuit—reissuance of the 
2010 rules based on a “commercially reasonable” standard. Reports 
suggest that Chairman Wheeler planned for the Commission to vote 
on such rules at its December 2014 meeting.46 
In November 2014, shortly before the cutoff for the Chairman 
to announce the agenda for the December open Commission 
meeting, the Commission abruptly changed tack. This immediately 
followed a high-profile statement by President Obama calling on the 
Commission to reclassify Internet access as a Title II service.47 
Chairman Wheeler denies that this change in direction resulted from 
the President’s statement. Rather, he says that he “became concerned 
that the relatively untested ‘commercially reasonable’ standard might 
be subsequently interpreted to mean what was reasonable for the 
ISP’s commercial arrangements.”48 Apparently, he felt that the best 
solution to this concern was to radically alter the Commission’s 
approach to the Open Internet Order as opposed to adding one or two 
sentences clarifying the meaning of the existing text. 
Over the following weeks, the Commission staff drafted new 
rules, substantially rewriting the Order to reclassify Internet access 
as a Title II Telecommunications Service. The new rules were 
circulated to the FCC Commissioners in early February and adopted 
by a 3-2 vote on February 26, 2015.49 
Since adoption, the rules have been published by the 
Commission and in the Federal Register—procedural requirements 
for parties to challenge the rules in court. The rules will go into 
effect on June 12, 2015, pending a possible stay issued by the 
                                                     
 46. Gautham Nagesh & Brody Mullins, Net Neutrality: How White House 
Thwarted RCC Chief, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 4, 2015, 7:52 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-white-house-thwarted-fcc-chief-on-internet-rules-
1423097522.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at Silicon Flatirons Center 
(Feb. 9, 2015). 
 49. Ruiz & Lohr, supra note 47; Press Release, FCC, FCC Adopts Strong 
Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open Internet (Feb. 26, 2015), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-332260A1.pdf. 
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Commission or Federal Court.50 As of this writing, eight lawsuits 
challenging the Order have been filed—six in the D.C. Circuit and 
one in the Fifth Circuit by parties arguing, for various reasons, that 
the rules need to be thrown out; one in the Third Circuit arguing that 
the rules need to be remanded to the Commission because they are 
too weak to meet the Commission’s statutory obligations.51 
B. The Order’s Statutory Basis 
The most controversial aspect of the Commission’s Order is the 
statutory authority upon which it is based.52 As with the 2010 rules, 
the Commission has continued to rely on § 706 to provide statutory 
authority for its rules. But it has also reclassified a newly defined 
class of service—Broadband Internet Access Service (BIAS)—as a 
Title II Telecommunications Service. The 2015 Open Internet Order 
relies on both of these statutory bases in parallel, not in the 
alternative.53 
As discussed previously, the Commission’s use of § 706 is 
premised on its “virtuous cycle” theory.54 Section 706 requires that 
the Commission “shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable 
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all 
Americans.”55 The Commission’s basic theory is that its Open 
                                                     
 50. As of this writing, one petition for such a stay has been filed. See 
Kathryn Bachman, Telecom, Cable Industries File with FCC to Stay Net Neutrality 
Order, KATYONTHEHILL (May 1, 2015, 4:00 PM), http://katyonthehill.com/telecom-
industry-files-with-fcc-to-stay-net-neutrality-order. 
 51. John Eggerton, FCC’s Open Internet Order Challenged in 3rd Circuit, 
MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Apr. 24, 2015, 6:34 PM), http://www.multichannel. 
com/news/technology/fccs-open-internet-order-challenged-3rd-circuit/390081. 
 52. The Order also applies its rules to mobile wireless service—the 2010 
Order had exempted mobile wireless service from most of its requirements. In the 
case of mobile, the 2015 Order also uses Title III, which gives the Commission 
authority to regulate use of spectrum in the public interest, as a statutory basis. 
Consideration of the Order’s treatment of mobile wireless is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
 53. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 1120110, ¶ 
273, at *76 (2015); see also Wheeler, supra note 48 (“My proposal will also use the 
significant powers in Section 706, not as a substitute but as a second tool. This one-
two punch . . . applies Title II, as well as Section 706, to protect broadband Internet 
access. It is the FCC using all of the tools in its toolbox to protect innovators and 
consumers.”). 
 54. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION; see also 2015 WL 1120110, ¶ 20, 
at *7. 
 55. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012); see also § 1302(b) (“If the Commission’s 
determination [whether advanced telecommunications capability is being deployed 
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Internet rules will promote the deployment of new edge services (i.e., 
applications) that, in turn, will drive consumer demand for BIAS, 
which, in turn, will increase investment by ISPs to meet that 
consumer demand. This interpretation is relatively uncontroversial—
it is supportable on current understandings of Chevron deference and 
has been upheld by the D.C. and Tenth Circuits.56  
More controversial is the Commission’s reclassification of 
BIAS as a Title II service.57 The reasons that this is controversial will 
be considered in detail in Part II—generally, it is because of the 
breadth of the Commission’s authority under Title II and concern 
over whether it is appropriate for the Commission to apply this broad 
authority to Internet-related regulations, as a matter of statutory 
authority, congressional intent, and sound policy—for now our focus 
is merely to describe what the Commission has done in the Open 
Internet Order.  
The first main reason that reclassification is controversial is 
because Title II gives the Commission broad and nearly pervasive 
authority to regulate telecommunications carriers. For instance, 
§ 215 of the Communication Act requires that the Commission 
examine into transactions entered into by any common carrier which relate 
to the furnishing of equipment, supplies, research, services, finances, 
credit, or personnel to such carrier and/or which may affect the changes 
made or to be made and/or the services rendered or to be rendered by such 
carrier, in wire or radio communication subject to this chapter, and shall 
report to the Congress whether any such transactions have affected or are 
likely to affect adversely the ability of the carrier to render adequate 
service to the public, or may result in any undue or unreasonable increase 
in charges or in the maintenance of undue or unreasonable charges for 
such service; and in order to fully examine into such transactions the 
Commission shall have access to and the right of inspection and 
examination of all accounts, records, and memoranda including all 
documents, papers, and correspondence now or hereafter existing, of 
persons furnishing such equipment, supplies, research, services, finances, 
credit, or personnel.58 
Title II comprises over fifty such sections. Some address very narrow 
concerns—albeit by giving the Commission broad authority. Section 
                                                                                                                
to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion] is negative, it shall take 
immediate action to accelerate deployment of such capability by removing barriers 
to infrastructure investment and by promoting competition in the 
telecommunications market.”). 
 56. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 641 (D.C. Cir. 2014); In re FCC 11–
161, 753 F.3d 1015, 1042 (10th Cir. 2014). 
 57. 2015 WL 1120110, ¶ 306, at *85. 
 58. 47 U.S.C. § 215(a). 
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222, for instance, gives the Commission authority to regulate 
privacy-related aspects of Title II services.59 Other provisions are 
very broad. Section 201, for instance, empowers the Commission 
generally to ensure that “[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and 
regulations for and in connection with such communication service, 
shall be just and reasonable.”60 
Reclassification empowers the Commission to use the full 
extent of this very broad authority. Curiously, it should be noted, it is 
not clear whether this authority supports all of its substantive rules. 
In particular, § 202 prohibits only “unjust or unreasonable 
discrimination.”61 Yet the new rules include absolute bars on 
throttling and so-called paid prioritization, both of which are forms 
of discrimination—such an absolute bar may be in conflict with the 
“unjust or unreasonable” limitation on this authority.62 
Importantly, the Commission is not required to apply all of the 
provisions of Title II. To the contrary, § 10 of the 
Telecommunications Act requires the Commission to forbear from 
provisions that are no longer necessary due, generally, to changes in 
the market.63 In the Open Internet Order, the Commission forbore 
from thirty sections of Title II. This is, itself, controversial because 
arguments have been made for and against forbearance of nearly 
every provision in Title II. Moreover, there is reasonable concern 
that the “core” provisions of Title II—primarily §§ 201 and 202, 
from which the Commission did not forbear—effectively give the 
Commission pervasive authority over ISPs’ business practices. 
The other main reason that reclassification is controversial is 
that the Commission has consistently argued that Internet access is 
not subject to Title II regulation. This has been the consistent 
position of the Commission for as long as it has been a question. It 
has been the position of the Commission under both Democratic and 
                                                     
 59. Id. § 222. Following reclassification, the scope of this authority over 
various aspects of the Internet ecosystem is uncertain. The Commission held a 
workshop on April 28, 2015, to consider these issues. See Public Workshop on 
Broadband Consumer Privacy, FCC (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/events/ 
wcb-and-cgb-public-workshop-broadband-consumer-privacy. 
 60. 47 U.S.C. § 201. 
 61. Id. § 202(a) (emphasis added).  
 62. Indeed, Chairman Wheeler testified before Congress that “there is 
nothing in Title II that prohibits paid prioritization”—though he has since walked 
back that statement. Oversight of the Federal Communications Commission Before 
the Subcomm. on Commc’ns & Tech. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
133th Cong. (statement of Tom Wheeler, Chairman, FCC). 
 63. 47 U.S.C. § 160. 
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Republican leadership. It is a position that has been accepted by 
Congress and is the position enshrined in the text of the 
Telecommunications Act.64 And it is a position that the Commission 
brought to and successfully defended before the Supreme Court.65 It 
is unsurprising that so complete a change in policy is controversial—
and, as discussed in Part II, it raises important and difficult legal 
questions. 
C. What Does the Open Internet Order Do? 
A detailed discussion of the substance of the Order is well 
beyond the scope of this Article. It can, however, be described at a 
high level.  
The core provisions of the Order comprise four rules. The first 
three are specific: No Blocking, No Throttling, and No Paid 
Prioritization.66 These rules generally prevent ISPs from blocking 
access to lawful Internet content, slowing down users’ access to 
specific Internet content or “favoring” certain content (e.g., by 
providing enhanced access to ISP-preferred content as compared to 
other content) in exchange for payments or other consideration from 
that content’s owners. The fourth rule prohibits “[u]nreasonable 
[i]nterference or [u]nreasonable [d]isadvantage [s]tandard for 
Internet [c]onduct.”67 The Order also includes enhanced transparency 
rules, requiring ISPs to disclose various information about their 
services and policies.68 
The Order identifies and carves out a number of practices from 
the scope of these rules, reserving treatment of those practices to 
future determination by the Commission. These practices include 
interconnection,69 “zero-rating” and sponsored-data plans,70 
specialized services (also known as “non-BIAS data services”),71 and 
content delivery networks (CDNs).72 It also establishes an 
ombudsperson to facilitate consumer complaints and enforcement 
                                                     
 64. Id. § 230. 
 65. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 973 (2005). 
 66. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 1120110, ¶¶ 14-
19, at *76 (2015).  
 67. Id. ¶¶ 133-35, at *36-37. 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 23-24, at *7.  
 69. Id. ¶¶ 28-31, at *8-9. 
 70. Id. ¶¶ 151-53, at *42. 
 71. Id. ¶¶ 207-13, at *60-61. 
 72. Id. ¶¶ 190, 340, at *54, 96.  
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action against ISPs;73 and establishes a procedure for firms wanting 
to offer services that may violate the rules to seek advisory opinions 
or waivers.74 
II. THE CHALLENGES TO THE ORDER 
The 2015 Order is the Commission’s third bite at the net 
neutrality apple—both its initial effort with the 2005 Internet Policy 
Statement and its 2010 Open Internet Order were rejected by the 
courts.75 And, despite not going into effect until June 12, 2015, eight 
lawsuits challenging the Order have already been filed as of May 1, 
2015. These challenges come as no surprise—throughout the drafting 
process it was clear that the Order would be challenged, especially if 
the Commission reclassified Internet access as a Title II service. 
Indeed, Commissioner Ajit Pai, one of the two dissenting 
commissioners, filed a sixty-three page dissenting statement with the 
Order, outlining many arguments against it.76 
This Part discusses a number of the challenges being raised 
against the Order.77 It focuses on two general classes of arguments: 
those based in issues broader than the Order itself, and those that cut 
to the substantive heart of net neutrality regulation. In specific, it 
considers arguments that the FCC lacks statutory authority to 
regulate Internet access, that the Commission’s prior classification of 
                                                     
 73. Id. ¶¶ 254-56, at *71.  
 74. Id. ¶¶ 229-39, at *66-68. Waiver is available on a case-by-case basis for 
any Commission rules—the Open Internet rules are not treated differently and afford 
no additional availability of waivers. See id. ¶ 130, at *36. The Commission, 
however, adopts a more restrictive waiver rule to govern paid prioritization and 
notes that it “anticipate[s] granting such relief only in exceptional cases.” Id. ¶¶ 130, 
132, at *36. 
 75. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting 
the 2005 Internet Policy Statement); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 655-59 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (rejecting the 2010 Open Internet Order). 
 76. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 1120110, at 
*212-66 (dissenting statement of Comm’r Ajit Pai). 
 77. Other challenges to the Order include: insufficiency of the notice 
provided by the May 2014 NPRM, and, in particular, that the final rule was not a 
“logical outgrowth” of the rules anticipated by the notice; First and Fifth 
Amendment challenges to the Order (either of which would be an incredibly 
important holding, clarifying longstanding areas of debate within the telecom 
industry, and more generally; but neither of which is likely to be addressed by the 
courts, per the canon of constitutional avoidance); regulation of mobile wireless 
under a common carrier standard, contrary to 47 USC § 332(c); and impropriety of 
the Commission’s new interpretation of the definition of the “Public Switched 
Network” to include the Internet. 
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Internet access as a Title I service imposes heightened requirements 
on reclassification,78 and that the Order is arbitrary and capricious for 
having failed to address contrary material submitted in the record.79 
Any of these challenges could lead to the reversal of the Order. 
Importantly, the first two could establish precedent with general 
impact on all administrative agencies; the third could undermine 
future efforts by the FCC to establish strong prophylactic rules (e.g., 
barring paid prioritization absolutely as opposed to evaluating paid 
prioritization arrangements under a case-by-case “commercially 
reasonable” standard).  
A. The Commission Lacks Authority to Regulate “The Most 
Powerful Network Ever” 
The most important challenge to the Commission’s Order is to 
its basic authority to regulate Internet Access. This challenge is 
important in part because it goes to the limits of the Commission’s 
regulatory authority. But the challenge stems from broader issues in 
American administrative law and could therefore have implications 
far beyond the Commission and its Open Internet order. Since its 
seminal decision in Chevron, the Supreme Court has struggled to 
define the outer boundaries of agencies’ regulatory authority. Under 
Chevron, agencies receive broad deference in interpreting their 
statutes.80 But that deference is not unlimited, and, from time to time, 
the Commission has excoriated agencies for acting outside the scope 
of their regulatory authority. For instance, in Brown and Williamson, 
the Court rejected the FDA’s efforts to regulate cigarettes as a drug 
delivery system, saying that it “Congress could not have intended to 
delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an 
agency in so cryptic a fashion.”81 This concern was echoed in the 
                                                     
 78. Discussion of these first two challenges draws substantially from Justin 
(Gus) Hurwitz, Regulating the Most Powerful Network Ever, 10 PERSP. FROM FSF 
SCHOLARS, Feb. 19, 2015, available at http://www.freestatefoundation. 
org/images/Regulating_the_Most_Powerful_Network_Ever_021815.pdf. 
 79. Discussion of this third challenge draws in part from Gus Hurwitz, 
Chairman Wheeler and the Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Open Internet 
Order, TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM (Mar. 17, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www. 
techpolicydaily.com/communications/terrible-horrible-no-good-open-internet-order. 
 80. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
862 (1984). 
 81. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 
(2000); see also Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) 
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more recent Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG), in which the 
Court rejected the EPA’s efforts to regulate greenhouse gasses when 
doing so required the EPA to effectively rewrite (“tailor”) its 
statutory authority in order to implement its authority in a reasonable 
manner.82 But these cases have been the exception to the general 
trend of Chevron deference, which has been to extend deference 
broadly and to rely on the political process—not the courts—to 
check any regulatory abuses. This is perhaps best seen in the recent 
City of Arlington case, in which the Court extended Chevron 
deference to the FCC in determining the jurisdictional boundaries 
laid out in its statute—arguably giving the Commission authority to 
define the boundaries of its own authority.83 Should challenges to the 
Commission’s Order ultimately make it to the Supreme Court, as 
many suggest is possible, this will likely be a central question 
considered by the Justices. 
We can frame this question as whether the Commission has 
authority to regulate Internet access under Title II.84 Proponents of 
the Chairman’s proposal take for granted that such classification is 
appropriate.85 It is useful to spend a moment considering why this 
                                                                                                                
(“[The Court] expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency 
decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’”). 
 82. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2446 (2014) (“[T]he 
need to rewrite clear provisions of the statute should have alerted EPA that it had 
taken a wrong interpretive turn.”); id. at 2446 (“The power of executing the laws . . . 
does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in 
practice.”). 
 83. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874-75 (2013). While City 
of Arlington is generally framed as asking whether Chevron deference extends to 
jurisdictional ambiguity, Justice Scalia’s opinion upholding deference for the 
Commission quite convincingly explains that the line between “jurisdictional” and 
“substantive” statutory language is itself ambiguous, such that Chevron should 
not—indeed cannot—apply differently for the two types of question. Id. at 1868-70. 
 84. This could be approached either as a Chevron “Step Zero” or “Step 
Two” question. Under a “Step Zero” analysis, the question would be whether 
Congress intended to delegate to the FCC authority to regulate “the most powerful 
network ever,” see Hurwitz, Regulating the Most Powerful Network Ever, supra 
note 78, at 4; under a “Step Two” analysis, the question would be whether a 
construction of the Communications Act giving the Commission such broad 
authority is permissible reading the statute as a whole. 
 85. Communicators with Gigi Sohn (C-SPAN television broadcast Feb. 6, 
2015), available at http://www.c-span.org/video/?324180-1/communicators-gigi-
sohn; Amir Nasr, FCC Will Head to Court to Defend Net Neutrality…Again, 
MORNING CONSULT (Aug. 13, 2015), http://morningconsult.com/2015/08/fcc-will-
head-to-court-to-defend-net-neutrality-again/ (quoting Marvin Ammori as saying 
“‘It will be super easy to defend in court,’ Marvin Ammori, a leading advocate for 
network neutrality and affiliate scholar at Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet 
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confidence is misplaced. Their view stems largely from the apparent 
support that all nine Justices expressed for Title II classification in 
Brand X.86 There are three basic reasons why Brand X does not 
establish that the Commission has authority to regulate Internet 
access. First, whether it is appropriate to classify broadband Internet 
access as a telecommunications service was not a question at issue in 
Brand X, such that the Court did not inquire deeply into, let alone 
decide, the matter.87 Second, to the extent the Justices were cognizant 
of the issue, their focus was on specific sections of Title II—those 
relating to the unbundling of and access to unbundled network 
elements—which is a substantially narrower question than whether 
Internet access is appropriately the subject of Title II at all.88 While 
logically no part of Title II can apply if Title II cannot apply at all, 
the Justices’ consideration of the former in Brand X was premised on 
undeveloped and unchallenged assumptions about the latter. And 
third, even if these issues had been squarely before the Court, the 
Internet today—both in terms of the technology and its importance 
as a social, economic, and political platform—is different today than 
it was a decade ago. This changed factual setting could easily change 
the outcome of the Court’s analysis. 
Chevron’s basic inquiry is into congressional intent: Did 
Congress intend for the Commission to exert the authority that it is 
claiming? Statutory ambiguity, such as exists in the Communications 
Act’s definitions, is an important condition for an agency to claim 
deference—lacking such ambiguity, the intent of Congress is 
generally clear, and “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as 
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”89 But ambiguity is only the start of the matter—
ambiguous terms alone do not render congressional intent unclear; 
nor does it give the agency carte blanche in resolving the ambiguity. 
As explained by the Court in UARG: 
[R]easonable statutory interpretation must account for both “the specific 
context in which . . . language is used” and “the broader context of the 
statute as a whole.” A statutory “provision that may seem ambiguous in 
                                                                                                                
and Society, said in an interview. ‘They just need to clarify why they changed their 
mind, they don’t even need to explain if one is better than the other.’”). 
 86. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 973, 1005 (2005). 
 87. See generally id. 
 88. Id. at 988. 
 89. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
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isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . 
because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive 
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” Thus, an agency 
interpretation that is “inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the 
statute as a whole” does not merit deference.90  
UARG frames the basic challenge to classification of 
broadband Internet access services as telecommunications services. 
The Chairman’s plan involves not just classifying these services 
under Title II, but “moderniz[ing] Title II, tailoring it for the 21st 
century,”91 by “taking the legal construct that once was used for 
phone companies and paring it back to modernize it.”92 In effect, the 
Chairman means to create a new legal regime for the regulation of 
broadband Internet access. Indeed, it almost necessarily must create a 
new legal regime because, as described in a moment, applying some 
portions of Title II does not make sense in the context of the modern 
Internet. The Court is likely to view efforts to rewrite the statute in 
this way with substantial skepticism because the need to 
“modernize” the statute suggests that the Chairman’s proposal is 
incompatible with the congressionally designed statutory structure. 
In UARG, the EPA’s decision to regulate greenhouse emissions 
for motor vehicles triggered statutory permitting requirements for 
stationary sources of greenhouse gasses as well. The statute requires 
permitting of any stationary source emitting more than 250 (or in 
some cases 100) tons of air pollutants per year.93 Classifying 
greenhouse gasses as air pollutants substantially increases the 
number of stationary sources subject to this permitting 
requirement—a burden that neither the EPA nor those subject to its 
regulations could reasonably be expected to meet. In order to avoid 
this absurd result, the EPA adopted a “tailoring” rule, under which it 
would only enforce the permitting requirement for stationary sources 
emitting 100,000 tons of greenhouse gasses per year.94  
                                                     
 90. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 
(2014) (internal citations omitted). 
 91. Tom Wheeler, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler: This is How We Will 
Ensure Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/ 
2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality/. 
 92. FCC Proposes Treating All Internet Traffic Equally, PBS NewsHour 
(PBS television broadcast Feb. 4, 2015, 6:35 PM), available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
newshour/bb/fcc-proposes-treating-all-internet-traffic-equally. 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (1977). 
 94. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). 
684 Michigan State Law Review  2015:665 
The Court found fault with, and rejected, this approach on 
several grounds. First, as explained by Justice Scalia, entirely 
separate from the need to “tailor” the statute, the fact that the EPA’s 
adopted approach “would place plainly excessive demands on 
limited governmental resources is alone a good reason for rejecting 
it.”95 We do not expect that Congress intended to place implausible 
burdens on an agency (or, for that matter, those it regulates), 
especially if alternative readings of the statute are possible. Second, 
the Court finds that the “EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable 
because it would bring about an enormous and transformative 
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional 
authorization.”96 Both of these concerns reflect the basic premise that 
the Court “expect[s] Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign 
to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political 
significance.’”97  
There is no question that applying the full force of Title II—a 
statute designed to regulate an industry that effectively consisted of a 
single firm—to an industry that today comprises literally thousands 
of firms98 would impose excessive burdens on the FCC, state 
regulators, and the industry. Title II, for instance, requires the 
Commission to examine every detail of a telecommunications 
carrier’s business, including all transactions that relate to “the 
furnishing of equipment, supplies, research, services, finances, 
credit, or personnel.”99 Title II gives the Commission authority over, 
and requires in the first instance that it exercise authority over, every 
aspect of a regulated carrier’s business.100 This may have made sense 
in the era of a telephone monopoly, especially one using relatively 
simple technology deployed in a static manner to provide a small 
number of services to homogeneous customers. It makes absolutely 
no sense in the context of today’s market—a market in which 
                                                     
 95. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. 
 98. For instance, WISPA (which opposes Chairman Wheeler’s plan) has 
nearly 800 Wireless ISP members, Principal Members, WISPA, 
http://www.wispa.org/Directories/Member-Directory (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); 
the American Cable Association (which also opposes Chairman Wheeler’s plan) 
represents over 800 small and medium cable-based ISPs, About Us: ACA Overview, 
AMERICAN CABLE ASSOCIATION, http://www.americancable.org/about_us/aca_ 
overview_0 (last visited Aug. 11, 2015); and there are at least another 700 LECs 
offering broadband Internet access.  
 99. 47 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1934). 
 100. Id. 
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thousands of firms offer service using myriad technologies via 
networks that are effectively rebuilt every eighteen to twenty-four 
months to support a vast array of consumer uses under many 
different business models. The burden of applying Title II would 
clearly be excessive and would clearly amount to an “enormous and 
transformative expansion” of the Commission’s authority.101 
That the Chairman’s proposal would be an “enormous and 
transformative expansion” in the Commission’s authority can be 
seen in other ways as well.102 Despite his strenuous efforts to 
maintain the contrary, the Chairman is proposing to regulate what he 
has called on several recent occasions “the most powerful network in 
the history of mankind.”103 The first sentence of the 2015 Order 
similarly asserts that “[t]he open Internet drives the American 
economy and serves, every day, as a critical tool for America’s 
citizens to conduct commerce, communicate, educate, entertain, and 
engage in the world around them”;104 and the 2014 NPRM similarly 
begins with, “The Internet is America’s most important platform for 
economic growth, innovation, competition, [and] free 
expression . . . . [It] has been, and remains to date, the preeminent 
21st century engine for innovation and the economic and social 
benefits that follow.”105 The telephone network, which Title II was 
designed to regulate, is an important social and economic tool—but 
it would be a far stretch indeed to call it “the most important network 
in the history of mankind” or to call it “America’s most important 
platform for economic growth, innovation, competition, [and] free 
expression.” The Communications Act authorized the Commission 
to regulate the former, not the latter. 
The proposal is also contrary to the regulatory structure and 
approach that Congress has laid out for the Internet. While the 
Communications Act, as amended by the 1996 Telecom Act, is 
almost silent with respect to the Internet, it is not entirely silent.106 
Section 230 asserts very plainly that “[i]t is the policy of the United 
States . . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that 
                                                     
 101. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Hurwitz, Regulating the Most Powerful Network Ever, supra note 
78, at 1. 
 104. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 1120110, ¶ 1, at 
*2 (2015). 
 105. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, ¶ 1 
(2014). 
 106. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996). 
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presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer 
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”107 This is in line 
with the overall structure and purpose of the Telecom Act, which 
was enacted “to promote competition and reduce regulation.”108 The 
FCC’s approach to the Internet has followed this deregulatory path—
and over the past twenty years Congress has not seen a need to 
change either the statute or the Commission’s path. Indeed, one of 
the most important things that Congress has done legislatively with 
respect to the Internet is to consistently prohibit federal or state 
taxation of Internet access. Yet the Chairman has expressly 
acknowledged that his proposal would permit collection of Universal 
Service fees on broadband Internet access.109 While the mechanism is 
different from taxation, the effect is the same—an incremental 
increase in costs imposed by the state—and that effect is contrary to 
nearly two decades of clear congressional policy. 
This brings us to the EPA’s “tailoring rule” and its relation to 
the Commission’s forbearance authority. In UARG, the Court found 
that the EPA’s efforts to avoid the excessive burdens resulting from 
its statutory construction by “tailoring” the permitting requirements 
were problematic for two reasons.110 First, the tailoring effort was 
itself problematic; and second, the need to tailor the rules 
demonstrated that its interpretation was contrary to the statutory 
scheme designed by Congress.111 In discussing these concerns, the 
Court explained: 
An agency has no power to “tailor” legislation to bureaucratic policy goals 
by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms. . . . Were we to recognize the 
authority claimed by EPA in the Tailoring Rule, we would deal a severe 
blow to the Constitution’s separation of powers. . . . The power of 
executing the laws necessarily includes both authority and responsibility 
to resolve some questions left open by Congress that arise during the law’s 
administration. But it does not include a power to revise clear statutory 
terms that turn out not to work in practice. . . . 
                                                     
 107. Id. § 230(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 108. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151) (emphasis added).  
 109. See FCC, THE OPEN INTERNET ORDER: PERSERVING AND PROTECTING 
THE INTERNET FOR ALL AMERICANS (Mar. 12, 2015), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-332486A1.pdf (“With respect 
to Universal Service, the Order . . . allows a current, separate proceeding on how to 
reform universal service contributions to proceed.”).  
 110. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444-45 (2014). 
 111. Id. 
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We reaffirm the core administrative-law principle that an agency may not 
rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should 
operate. . . . Instead, the need to rewrite clear provisions of the statute 
should have alerted EPA that it had taken a wrong interpretive turn. . . . 
Because the Tailoring Rule cannot save EPA’s interpretation of the 
triggers, that interpretation was impermissible under Chevron.112  
The Chairman’s proposed “modernization” of Title II is clearly an 
effort to “revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in 
practice” and to “rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of 
how the statute should operate.” This suggests that the Commission 
has “taken a wrong interpretive turn” and that its “interpretation [is] 
impermissible under Chevron.” 
The obvious response to these concerns is that, unlike the EPA, 
the Communications Act gives the FCC express power to forbear 
from enforcing unnecessary provisions of the Act (including portions 
of Title II).113 As such, the Commission is congressionally authorized 
to forbear from applying those portions of Title II that would cause 
the statute “not to work out in practice.”114 The Chairman’s proposed 
approach would therefore be in line with congressional design, 
Congress having expressly granted forbearance authority. This is a 
legitimate and important difference between the EPA’s and FCC’s 
tailoring efforts. But the Commission’s forbearance authority is not 
unlimited, and reliance on forbearance to save the proposed rules is 
arguably subject to the same infirmities as the EPA’s approach. 
There are at least two reasons why forbearance does not save 
the FCC’s tailoring approach. First, and simplest, it is likely the case 
that forbearance is not permanent—should the Commission find at a 
later date that the conditions giving rise to forbearance have changed 
(including simply that it is, in the (current or future) Commission’s 
view, in the public interest to discontinue its forbearance), any 
provision of Title II could come back into force. Thus, the argument 
that forbearance pares back the most onerous provisions of Title II, 
thereby easing concerns about the burdens Title II regulation 
imposes and the expansion in scope of the FCC’s power, is illusory. 
These problems are only avoided by the grace of the Commission’s 
own beneficence. Forbearance, in other words, is no cure to the 
previous concerns expressed by the Court in UARG—concerns that 
Justice Scalia explained provided sufficient basis on their own (i.e., 
                                                     
 112. Id. at 2445-46. 
 113. 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1996). 
 114. Id. 
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independent of the EPA’s tailoring efforts) to reject the EPA’s 
rules.115 
Second, and more nuanced: The FCC’s forbearance power is 
limited, such that forbearance can only be granted under certain 
circumstances. This means that forbearance may not be sufficient to 
address concerns of excessive burden and statutory structure. Section 
10 requires that the Commission forbear from enforcing provisions 
of the Communications Act subject to three conjunctive conditions: 
Enforcement is not necessary to ensure just and reasonable prices 
and practices, enforcement is not necessary for the protection of 
consumers, and forbearing from enforcement is in the public 
interest.116 None of these factors considers whether forbearance is 
necessary to make the Commission’s preferred construction of the 
statute work in practice, and the fact that forbearance may be 
necessary in order to make the statute work is not on its own 
sufficient to trigger forbearance. As a result, it is entirely possible 
that the Commission’s classification of broadband Internet access 
under Title II could yield burdensome, or otherwise problematic, 
results sufficient to render the classification impermissible.  
The Order’s “modernization” of Title II is therefore based on 
authority just as weak as that upon which the EPA based its 
“tailoring rule.” The FCC does have authority to forbear from 
enforcing portions of the Communications Act—and the EPA, like 
every agency, has some discretion to determine how it exercises its 
authority. But the FCC’s power is not discretionary: Section 10 is 
written in the imperative requiring that “the Commission shall 
forbear” if certain conditions are met.117 The statutory design, 
therefore, serves to constrain the Commission’s discretion over what 
provisions of the Communications Act it enforces.118 It is not a 
mechanism to allow the Commission to “rewrite clear statutory terms 
to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate.”119 It allows 
the Commission to trim the fat of the statute, not to excise tumors 
threatening to consume it. As such, like any other agency, the FCC 
cannot “‘adopt . . . unreasonable interpretations of statutory 
                                                     
 115. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2445-46. 
 116. See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a). The statement of the first requirement is a 
paraphrase. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See generally id. 
 119. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446 (“We reaffirm the core administrative-law 
principle that an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of 
how the statute should operate.”). 
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provisions and then edit other statutory provisions to mitigate the 
unreasonableness.’”120 
The Order’s approach is made even more egregious because it 
is not compelled. In Verizon, the D.C. Circuit made clear—at a time 
prior to the Court’s decision in UARG—that § 706 presented a 
reasonable means to the Chairman’s desired ends.121 Had the 
Chairman opted to follow the path set forth by the D.C. Circuit, we 
would not find ourselves in the present situation, and the 
Commission would be on much firmer legal grounds. Rather, the 
Commission has elected to pursue the more aggressive path. The 
dangers of this discretionary path are substantial. As explained in the 
EPA context, “Since, as we hold above, the statute does not compel 
EPA’s interpretation, it would be patently unreasonable—not to say 
outrageous—for EPA to insist on seizing expansive power that it 
admits the statute is not designed to grant.”122 The Chairman’s 
chosen path is similarly unreasonable—and equally outrageous. 
This is particularly the case given how little sense the 
Chairman’s explanation for his sudden embrace of Title II makes. He 
has explained that at some point (roughly contemporaneous with the 
President urging him to take a Title II-based approach), he “became 
concerned that the relatively untested [§ 706-based] ‘commercially 
reasonable’ standard might be subsequently interpreted to mean what 
was reasonable for the ISP’s commercial arrangements.”123 In his 
words, that “was a possibility that was unacceptable,” and this led 
him to embrace Title II.124 This explanation, however, simply makes 
no sense. First, the D.C. Circuit had made clear that § 706, at least in 
its view, provides the Commission with the necessary authority.125 
And second, the concern that the “commercially reasonable” 
standard proposed in the May NPRM would be interpreted to 
protecting ISP’s commercial interests could be trivially addressed 
with a single sentence, along the lines of “Determinations of 
‘commercial reasonableness’ shall give substantial weight to the 
effects of those agreements upon consumers, and no agreement shall 
be deemed commercially reasonable that is not also substantially in 
the consumer interest.” 
                                                     
 120. Id. 
 121. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 122. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2446. 
 123. Wheeler, supra note 48. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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B. The Problematics of Changing Classifications 
The next challenge to consider is whether the FCC, having 
previously classified Internet access as a Title I “information 
service,” can now reclassify it as a Title II “telecommunications 
service.” This challenge turns on questions raised by—and so far 
unanswered—the Supreme Court’s holding in Fox I. In that opinion, 
the Court held that agencies are broadly free to change their prior 
interpretations of a statute and that the fact of a prior interpretation 
does not create any heightened burden upon the agency in adopting a 
changed interpretation.126 But the Court also indicated that this 
permissive approach to changed interpretations may not hold where 
the factual setting has significantly changed or where serious reliance 
interests are at stake.127 The challenge to the Order would give the 
courts opportunity to consider what these limitations mean.  
Proponents of the Order have expressed confidence that the 
courts will uphold the Commission’s reclassification. They first point 
to Brand X, in which all nine justices appeared amenable to 
classifying Internet access as a Title II telecommunication service.128 
As explained above, this reliance on Brand X is misplaced.129 And 
they also point to the first part of the Fox I holding in which the 
Court held that an agency’s prior construction of its statute generally 
does not create obstacles to a changed construction of that statute so 
long the changed construction is otherwise permissible.130  
This is not an unreasonable understanding of the law—but it is 
also not complete, and the outcome is not as certain as its proponents 
suggest. While agencies’ discretion to change between otherwise-
permissible constructions of the law is broad, it is not unbounded. As 
explained in Fox I, for instance, reliance interests may create a 
heightened bar to a changed interpretation.131 The meaning of this 
limitation has not been developed by the courts, but there is a sound 
argument that an industry that has invested hundreds of billions of 
                                                     
 126. Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 973, 1005 (2005). 
 129. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 130. See, e.g., Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 
1120110, ¶¶ 357-60, at *101-02 (2015).  
 131. Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (stating the agency may need to 
“provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy 
created on a blank slate . . . when its prior policy has engendered serious reliance 
interests that must be taken into account”). 
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dollars in private capital based on the prior classification has an 
established reliance interest.132 
Fox I also explains that an agency changing its evaluation of 
facts may justify greater scrutiny of the new policy.133 In the case of 
reclassification, the Commission will need to explain why its prior 
determination regarding incorporation of features such as Domain 
Name System (DNS) service does not preclude classification as a 
telecommunications service. This may be difficult given that ISPs 
today have become far more involved in managing the traffic 
flowing to and from users’ computers—including, for instance, 
filtering harmful traffic, making real-time capacity and load-
balancing decisions, and offering service-specific content delivery 
and interconnection services. Managing consumer-focused Internet 
access services is far more involved today than it was even a few 
years ago. Importantly, any effort to partition such management 
functions from the Order, for instance by treating them as reasonable 
network management practices, creates an exception with the 
potential to swallow the Order—while some consumers may want 
largely unmanaged Internet access, it is likely that most consumers 
do not care whether their service is managed and that a large portion 
of consumer demand would be better served by substantially 
managed Internet access. As a result of these (overwhelmingly pro-
consumer) services, users have less ability to control what 
information is sent from or received by points of their 
specification—the basic requirement for a service to be a 
“telecommunications service.”  
The Commission will also have to address the criticism that its 
existing policy has been overwhelmingly successful, and the changed 
                                                     
 132. See HAL SINGER, THREE WAYS THE FCC’S OPEN INTERNET ORDER WILL 
HARM INNOVATION (May 2015) (noting $76 billion of capex in 2014 alone, in the 
context of discussing the adverse effects of Title II classification on investment), 
available at http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015. 
05-Singer_Three-Ways-the-FCCs-Open-Internet-Order-Will-Harm-Innovation.pdf. 
This concern could also be analyzed from a due process or regulatory takings 
perspective, as the Order, by encumbering the use of the networks built with these 
investments, substantially devalues them. 
 133. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 515 (the agency may need to “provide a more 
detailed justification than what would suffice for a new policy created on a blank 
slate . . . when, for example, its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict 
those which underlay its prior policy. . . . In such cases it is not that further 
justification is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned 
explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were 
engendered by the prior policy.”). 
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policy is not in response to any manifest harms. The Internet 
economy has thrived under the Title I model, especially in the United 
States. Indeed, it is well documented that investment in the United 
States has substantially outpaced that in Europe and the rest of the 
world.134 Had there been examples of clear problems under the 
Commission’s Title I approach to the Internet, it would be much 
easier to meet Fox I’s requirement to justify its changed assessment 
of the facts—instead, given the overwhelming success of its prior 
approach, the Commission is likely to face at least some resistance in 
these efforts. 
Finally, the fact that the Order reclassifies Internet access 
implicates a nexus of First Amendment, Due Process, Takings, and 
related concerns. Thorough consideration of these issues is beyond 
the scope of this Article—indeed, it is unlikely that these issues will 
be addressed by the courts because there are narrower grounds 
available upon which the Order should be rejected. Nonetheless, 
these are important issues that should be raised on appeal and which 
ultimately cut to the quick of the Commission’s regulatory efforts. 
Reclassification of broadband Internet access from a largely 
unregulated Title I to a pervasively regulated Title II service can be 
seen as substantially burdening previously unburdened speech, as 
devaluating privately owned network infrastructure, or both. These 
raise clear, but complicated, First and Fifth Amendment issues. 
Reclassification also raises a perplexing question about the nature of 
common carrier services: Why is a common carrier a common 
carrier? Is it because of the nature of the service it offers and 
consumer demand for that service, or is it a consequence of legal 
definition? Traditional common carriers generally offer services that 
only make sense to be offered on a common-carriage basis, both as a 
function of consumer demand and supply-side economics. For 
instance, there would be little demand, or business justification, for a 
train service that only traverses some stations—once you’ve laid the 
                                                     
 134. See Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory and Internet Policy 33 
(May 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://scholarship. 
law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1467&context=faculty_scholarship; 
RICHARD BENNETT, AM. ENTERPRISE INST., G7 BROADBAND DYNAMICS: HOW POLICY 
AFFECTS BROADBAND QUALITY IN POWERHOUSE NATIONS, (2014), available at 
http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/G7-Broadband-Dynamics-
Final.pdf; Roslyn Layton & Michael Horney, Innovation, Investment, and 
Competition in Broadband and the Impact on America’s Digital Economy (Mercatus 
Center, Working Paper No. 14-22, Aug. 2014), available at 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Layton-Competitionin-Broadband.pdf. 
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tracks, you can’t not follow them. Similarly, there would be little 
demand for a postal service that only delivered to a range of 
addresses curated by the postal carrier—once you have built your 
distribution network, it is easier to serve all addresses in it than only 
some, for both consumers and carriers. On the other hand, there 
likely is consumer demand for internet services that only access a 
curated portion of the Internet—most consumers access only a very 
small portion of online content, many would like to be shielded from 
potentially harmful content, and it is in many ways easier to manage 
a network that carries only a deterministic set of content than one 
that must carry whatever content may be directed at it (by either its 
users or other, potentially harmful, agents). This raises the curious 
question: Could Internet service providers offer a curated Internet 
service that only allows users access to a finite range of content? 
And, if so, would that service be subject to the Open Internet Order? 
The answer to the first question seems likely yes—and the answer to 
the former seems no.135 
None of these arguments is dispositive—and, importantly, the 
contours of the relevant legal standards have not been meaningfully 
developed through litigation. While it is not unreasonable to think 
that the Court would ultimately uphold the Commission’s changed 
classification of broadband Internet access from an “information 
service” to a “telecommunications service,” it also is not as foregone 
a conclusion as proponents of the Open Internet Order assert. 
                                                     
 135. See Open Internet Order, 15 FCC Rcd. 24, ¶ 25, at 9-10 (2015). Recall 
that the definition of Broadband Internet Access Service given in the Order is “[a] 
mass-market retail service by wire or radio that provides the capability to transmit 
data to and receive data from all or substantially all Internet endpoints, including 
any capabilities that are incidental to and enable the operation of the 
communications service, but excluding dial-up Internet access service.” Id. 
(emphasis added). If the offered service only allows access to a small subset of 
Internet endpoints, it falls out of this definition. Id. The Commission may argue that 
the second sentence of its definition, stating that “This term also encompasses any 
service that the Commission finds to be providing a functional equivalent of the 
service described in the previous sentence, or that is used to evade the protections 
set forth in this Part,” would capture such a curated service. Id. But such an 
argument seems unlikely to prevail if there is consumer demand for such a curated 
offering. And it assumes the answer to the question presented above: What makes a 
common carrier a common carrier? The Commission’s argument would only 
succeed if common carrier status is a mere legal category that can be arbitrarily 
defined by regulatory actors—an argument to which the courts would likely be 
hostile. 
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C. The Order is Arbitrary and Capricious for Failure to Consider 
Relevant Factors 
The final challenge considered here is that the Open Internet 
Order is arbitrary and capricious—in specific for failing to consider 
or respond to adverse evidence in the record and for basing its 
determinations on conclusory analysis. Unlike the prior two 
challenges, which go to issues that are broader than the Order (and 
are therefore likely to draw the attention of the Supreme Court), this 
challenge goes to the underlying logic of the Order itself. Should the 
Order be rejected by the courts as arbitrary and capricious, it may be 
for reasons that the Commission is ultimately unable to remedy—
namely, that the overwhelming weight of the relevant literature does 
not support the Commission’s approach. 
The key precedent comes from the Supreme Court’s holding in 
State Farm:  
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.136  
The second and third of these factors are most relevant here: The 
Commission needs to have considered all important issues and to 
have responded adequately to significant comments introduced into 
the record.137 The D.C. Circuit—in which the initial appeal of the 
Order is likely to be heard—has a particularly high standard for 
agency consideration of record evidence. It has regularly rejected 
FCC orders on the grounds that they offer only conclusory 
analysis.138 
                                                     
 136. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 137. On agencies’ obligation to respond to significant comments—those 
which, if correct, would lead the agency to a different outcome—see Jonathan 
Weinberg, The Right to be Taken Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149, 157 (2012) 
(“Indeed, the D.C. Circuit urged, without an obligation that the agency respond to 
significant comments, the opportunity to comment would be ‘meaningless.’ The 
courts have repeatedly reaffirmed this obligation.”). 
 138. See, e.g., AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc. v. F.C.C., 270 F.3d 959, 968 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Conclusory explanations for matters involving a central factual 
dispute where there is considerable evidence in conflict do not suffice to meet the 
deferential standards of our review. . . . Because there is too much evidence in the 
record suggesting a contrary conclusion, however, the court is unable to discern why 
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The Order is, as a whole, poorly written. The prose is choppy 
and editing abrupt. It is clearly the product of hands working 
independently, with varying levels of expertise. Perhaps most 
important, however, the Order’s use of comments from the record is 
haphazard at best. While there were clearly a number of comments 
that defined the Commission’s discussion—for instance, those 
submitted by parties close to the Chairman’s office, such as Mozilla 
and Free Press—by and large it feels as though comments were 
found using computerized searches. Where the Commission needed 
support of its assertions, in other words, it searched the database of 
comments and included excerpts from those which supported its 
conclusions—and perhaps made a passing attempt at responding to 
those raising concerns. 
Of course, one can only speculate as to whether these criticisms 
reflect the actual process used by the Commission. The concerns 
they present, however, can be seen by looking at just a few 
paragraphs of the Order—specifically, the analysis supporting the 
Commission’s ban on paid prioritization.139 Concern about paid 
prioritization—and rhetoric about degradation, “fast lanes,” and 
“slow lanes”—was perhaps the driving concern leading up to the 
Commission’s May 2014 NPRM. It is therefore reasonable to expect 
that the Commission would have treated this discussion with some 
care—it should be at least as well presented as any other portion of 
the order.  
The key text of the Order’s discussion of paid prioritization is 
in paragraph 126, which explains that “[t]he paid prioritization ban 
we adopt today is based on the record that has developed in this 
proceeding.”140 This discussion makes reference to concerns that 
allowing paid prioritization “will result in the bifurcating of the 
                                                                                                                
the Commission [reached the conclusion that it did]. Accordingly, we [remand the 
case to the Commission for further explanation].”); Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. 
F.C.C., 524 F.3d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“But that aside, the Commission offered 
no reasoned explanation for its dismissal of empirical data that was submitted at its 
invitation. . . . Given the acknowledged critical nature [of this data], so conclusory a 
statement cannot substitute for a reasoned explanation, for it provides neither 
assurance that the Commission considered the relevant factors nor a discernable path 
to which the court may defer.”). See also AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d 729, 737 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 461 (D.C. Cir. 
2000).  
 139. See 15 FCC Rcd. 24, ¶ 126, at 53-55. As discussed below, I submitted 
extensive comments on this subject—which are presented in part in the next Part of 
this article.  
 140. Id. 
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Internet into a ‘fast’ lane . . . and a ‘slow’ lane,” and that paid 
prioritization could hamper entry, deter innovation, harm 
competition and consumers, and give rise to a litany of other 
problems. The Order cites two examples from the comments (both 
expressing concerns about how prioritization could affect 
development of high-bandwidth applications and content like video). 
And the commission asserts that its “conclusion is supported by a 
well-established body of economic literature.” 
The Commission’s reasoning does not stand up to even cursory 
scrutiny. To support the assertion that paid prioritization could cause 
a bifurcation of the Internet into “fast” and “slow” lanes, and in 
particular that this could lead to “degraded performance” for non-
prioritized traffic, the Commission points to comments from Mozilla 
(arguing that prioritization is “zero sum”),141 and to comments from 
Sandvine,142 which the Commission mischaracterizes as asserting that 
giving one application a greater share of that bandwidth reduces the 
bandwidth available for other applications.143 In fact, the Order cites 
to Mozilla’s comments twice for the same proposition.144  
Let’s start with the mischaracterization of the Sandvine 
comments. Sandvine’s discussion of paid prioritization starts by 
noting that “the FCC has put tremendous focus on Pay for Priority. 
We’re not quite sure why.”145 Sandvine goes on to explain why the 
Commission should not be worried about paid prioritization, arguing 
that the bifurcation argument—the one that that the Commission 
cites to support banning paid prioritization—is likely “technically 
unsound.”146 The Commission has taken the Sandvine comments out 
of context and misrepresented them as supporting its preferred policy 
conclusions. What is even worse, Sandvine’s actual argument that 
concerns about paid prioritization are technically and economically 
unsound directly contradicts the Commission’s bifurcation concern. 
How does the Commission resolve this contradiction? It doesn’t. The 
citation supporting the Commission’s “bifurcation” concern only 
                                                     
 141. CHRIS RILEY & ALEX FOWLER, COMMENTS OF MOZILLA 20 (2014), 
available at https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/files/2014/07/Mozilla-NN-
Comments-July-2014.pdf. 
 142. SANDVINE, COMMENTS OF SANDVINE INCORPORATED 8 (2014), available 
at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7521381623. 
 143. 15 FCC Rcd. 24, 54 n.287. 
 144. CHRIS RILEY & ALEX FOWLER, REPLY COMMENTS OF MOZILLA (2014), 
available at https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/files/2014/09/Mozilla-NN-Reply-
Comments-Sept-2014.pdf. 
 145. SANDVINE, supra note 142. 
 146. Id. at 9. 
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includes supporting comments—it simply ignores the concerns 
commenters like Sandvine have raised. 
And, lest there is any doubt as to Sandvine’s preferred policy 
outcome, it starts its comments by explaining that it “has seen 
firsthand how innovative service plans have increased adoption of 
the Internet around the world, enhanced competition, and given 
consumers more (and more affordable) choice.”147 And it spends the 
rest of its comments arguing that the Commission should protect 
innovative business models and billing arrangements—contrary to 
the Commission’s decision to ban or subject such arrangements to 
Commission scrutiny.148 It is perverse, at best, for the Commission to 
use Sandvine’s comments to make a point with which Sandvine 
disagrees in support of a policy that Sandvine was arguing against. 
The Commission does cite both an ex parte notice that I 
submitted and comments from ADTRAN as offering a contrary 
view. But it does nothing to consider, let alone rebut, these 
arguments beyond acknowledging them. Indeed, in another set of 
comments—which the Commission does not cite149—I explain in 
great detail why it is wrong to say that prioritization is “zero sum.” 
Contrast this with the Mozilla comments, which provide only a brief 
discussion that does little more than assert the zero-sum theory as 
true, without reference to any of the extensive literature in the field.  
Beyond making no serious attempt at making its own 
arguments or analyzing the sentences it cherry-picks from comments, 
the Commission also ignores the existing body of actual research 
directly relevant to paid prioritization. Asserting that its “conclusion 
is supported by a well-established body of economic literature,” the 
Order cites a total of six academic articles: four articles on price 
discrimination from the 1980s and two “more recent” articles (both 
are from 2000, one was never published), all of which are almost 
entirely irrelevant to the discussion of paid prioritization.150 
Meanwhile, the Commission makes no mention of the significant 
body of research conducted over the past decade on the precise 
question of paid prioritization—even though substantial portions of 
this literature were discussed in the record.151 To summarize this 
literature—which is discussed in more detail below—the consistent 
                                                     
 147. Id. at 2. 
 148. Id. at 2-3.  
 149. See infra Part III. 
 150. 15 FCC Rcd. 24, 55 n.296. 
 151. Indeed, I introduced much of this information into the record and 
mentioned it to Commission officials at various public and private meetings. 
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conclusion of this literature, almost to the paper, is that paid 
prioritization can be beneficial to consumers and to competition. It 
can also be harmful to both. It is difficult, if not impossible, to tell ex 
ante whether any specific form of paid prioritization will have 
beneficial, harmful, or indeterminate effects. It is a violation of the 
most basic principles that govern agency decision-making that the 
Commission simply chose to ignore the past decade of research on 
the very topic it was considering. But this is exactly what the 
Commission did. 
III. THE REALITY OF OPEN INTERNET REGULATION  
The discussion above indicates that there are various fields of 
research relevant to the Open Internet Order. The literature in these 
fields is robust and consistently leads to the same result: Neutrality 
can, in some cases, be beneficial to consumers, and in other cases, 
harmful; and conversely, non-neutrality can, in some cases, be 
harmful to consumers, and in other cases, beneficial. This Part looks 
to the literatures on the economics of vertical integration, openness 
and innovation, and multi-sided markets, as well as the operational 
characteristics of the Internet (statistical multiplexing and packet 
switching). And it explains that concern that “paid prioritization” 
necessarily creates “fast lanes” is technologically wrong and is based 
on misunderstandings of how the Internet works. Indeed, it is 
entirely possible that paid prioritization of some traffic can increase 
performance of other traffic, for purely technical reasons. Any rule, 
therefore, that prophylactically mandates or forecloses the adoption 
of broad classes of business structures or conduct is, almost by 
definition, arbitrary, and its adoption capricious. 
A. The Reality of “Openness” and Innovation 
A basic assumption of the Open Internet Order is that it is 
possible to craft pro-consumer Open Internet rules. While there may 
be some business practices and other forms of conduct that are 
sufficiently harmful (or beneficial) to consumers to merit ex ante 
treatment—such as conduct that would be clearly problematic under 
the antitrust laws—the effects on the wider range of practices or 
conduct subject to the Order is generally ambiguous. As such, it was 
ill-advised for the Commission to adopt strong rules—as discussed 
above, this almost necessarily renders the Order arbitrary and 
capricious. Rather, where the Commission feels that the potential for 
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harmful practices or conduct is great, it should provide guidance as 
to the standards by which it will assess whether specific instances 
are, in fact, harmful. Such guidance is likely a necessary requirement 
to satisfy constitutional due process and fair notice requirements, 
particularly where the Commission may want to seek fines or 
damages against a firm. 
Three types of organizational structures demonstrate this 
ambiguity: “open” innovation platforms, vertical integration, and 
multi-sided markets. 
Net neutrality advocates, the strongest supporters of Open 
Internet regulation, often assert that the Internet has thrived because 
it is “open.”152 Indeed, this idea is captured by (or perhaps has 
captured) the Commission’s own caption for both this and the 
previous Open Internet docket.153 The reality, however, is that 
“openness” is neither necessary nor sufficient for the sort of growth 
that the Internet has seen and fostered—indeed, it can limit such 
growth. Moreover, the Internet never has been open in the way that 
advocates suggest. 
1. The Internet as an “Open” Platform 
On the first point, literature and experience amply demonstrate 
that “open” platforms, or general-purpose technologies generally, 
can promote growth and increase social welfare, but they also 
demonstrate that open platforms can also limit growth and decrease 
                                                     
 152. See Marvin Ammori, We’re About to Lose Net Neutrality—and the 
Internet as We Know It, WIRED (Nov. 4, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.wired. 
com/2013/11/so-the-internets-about-to-lose-its-net-neutrality/ (calling net neutrality 
the Internet’s “foundational principle”); SAVE THE INTERNET, http://www. 
savetheinternet.com/sti-home (last visited Aug. 11, 2015) (“Net Neutrality has made 
the Internet an unrivaled space for free speech, civic participation, innovation and 
opportunity.”); BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND 
INNOVATION 1-2 (2010). But see Gus Hurwitz, An Unfounded Principle: Ammori’s 
Non-Neutral Network History, TECHPOLICYDAILY.COM (Nov. 13, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/internet/unfounded-principle-ammoris-non-neutral-
network-history/. 
 153. See Open Internet Order, Para 1; Protecting and Promoting the Open 
Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. at 5563 (“[I]nnovation and the economic and social benefits 
[of the Internet] . . . flow, in large part, from the open, end-to-end architecture of the 
Internet . . . .”). See generally Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry 
Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 (2010), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_ 
public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.pdf. 
700 Michigan State Law Review  2015:665 
social welfare compared to “closed” alternatives.154 There are several 
reasons for this. Developing open systems can impose costs on initial 
developers, both in their development of the system and their 
education of third parties in how to interface with it. It can ossify a 
system, as subsequent changes will have negative spillovers for third 
parties. It can fragment a system, if subsequent changes are made by 
the initial developer or subsequent developers choose to fork a 
project. It can impose technical costs, as an open system may need to 
be “more robustly” (e.g., inefficiently) engineered in order to support 
open interfaces. In particular, to be truly “open,” a system may need 
to make internal variables and functions available externally (to 
those outside the system), even where they are best kept internal to 
the system155—this can lead to substantively inefficient system 
design or inefficient use of development resources. An example of 
this can be seen in the architectural differences between the Internet 
Protocol stack, which is a four-layer model, and the Open Systems 
Interconnections (OSI) reference model, which is a seven-layer 
model.156 The OSI model is unquestionably more “open” in that it 
allows a larger number of interface pairings and the export of a 
greater number of internal variables and functions to facilitate those 
pairings; the OSI model, however, is rarely used, largely because it is 
grossly over-engineered.157 A protocol designed on the OSI model 
would cost more to develop, be harder to maintain, and have worse 
technical performance than one designed on a more streamlined (and 
less “open”) model.158 
                                                     
 154. Timothy F. Bresnahan & M. Trajtenberg, General Purpose 
Technologies “Engines of Growth?”, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83, 94-96 (1995); see 
also Christopher S. Yoo, Modularity Theory and Internet Policy 33 (May 1, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1467&context=faculty_scholarship (discussing the same). 
 155. See Yoo, supra note 154, at 22-24 (discussing interdependency and 
information hiding between modules).  
 156. See generally Andrew L. Russell, OSI: The Internet That Wasn’t, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (July 30, 2013), http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/osi-the-
internet-that-wasnt (discussing the relationship between the OSI and Internet 
model). The two models’ layer approaches represent somewhat different purposes 
but are broadly comparable. See id. 
 157. See id. (“‘On one side you have something that’s free, available, you 
just have to load it. And on the other side, you have something which is much more 
architectured, much more complete, much more elaborate, but it is expensive.’” 
(quoting Interview with Marc Levilion, Eng’r, IBM Fr. (2012))). 
 158. As a simple, but important, example: The most computationally time-
consuming process performed in the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) stack is the passing of the payload (the actual data being sent 
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Beyond the academic literature, much of which is grounded on 
theory or models, the relative merits of open versus closed systems 
has been vividly played out in practice. The classic fights here have 
played out between, e.g., IBM (a closed system model) and IBM-
compatible PCs (open systems); between Apple (a notoriously closed 
system) and other OS models (e.g., Linux, an open system; and 
Microsoft, an intermediary model); between application vendors 
(e.g., traditional closed-source models and the open-source 
development model); and between different mobile platforms (e.g., 
between Apple’s closed iOS and Google’s partially-open Android 
platform).159 The results of these fights are generally well known and 
demonstrate the indeterminacy of the value of “openness.” Apple is 
the clearest example demonstrating the success of closed models.160 
The Apache web server is a leading example of the value of 
openness.161 Google’s Android is an enlightening example. Google 
                                                                                                                
between endpoints) between layers. In a truly “open” stack, TCP/IP, being a four-
layer stack, requires data to be copied three times across the memory bus; for large 
packets, this can dramatically increase latency. An OSI model, being a seven-layer 
stack, would require twice as many copies. The seminal article on this issue is David 
D. Clark et al., An Analysis of TCP Processing Overhead, IEEE COMM. MAG., May 
2002, at 94, available at http://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/Publications/PubPDFs/ 
An%20Analysis%20of%20TCP%20Processing%20Overhead.pdf (“What we 
showed was that the code necessary to implement TCP was not the major limitation 
to overall performance. In fact, . . . the throughput is close to being limited by the 
memory bandwidth of the system.”). An integrated, “closed,” stack, on the other 
hand, can perform this same function with a single copy operation. Many high-
performance IP stacks do precisely this, often integrating the IP or even 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) processing functions with the network 
interface (“offloading” the IP or TCP processing). See generally, e.g., PAVAN 
BALAJI, HEMAL V. SHAH & D.K. PANDA, SOCKETS VS RDMA INTERFACE OVER 10-
GIGABIT NETWORKS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THE MEMORY TRAFFIC BOTTLENECK 
(2004), available at http://www.mcs.anl.gov/~balaji/pubs/2004/rait/rait04. 
10gige.pdf (discussing several of these approaches). Importantly, this involves a 
form of deep-packet inspection, where the middle layers of the IP stack need to both 
look down the stack into a packet’s headers and up the stack into system state 
information in order to directly place a packet’s payload directly into application 
memory in its initial copy operation.  
 159. See generally JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—
AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). 
 160. See Yoo, supra note 154, at 55-57.  
 161. For important recent work on this topic, see Shane Greenstein & Frank 
Nagle, Digital Dark Matter and the Economic Contribution of Apache (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19507, 2013), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w19507 (“We argue that these findings point to a large 
potential undercounting of the rate or return from IT spillovers from the invention of 
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develops the core OS on an open source basis but retains closer 
control over the core suite of applications that run on the platform.162 
One should also consider Wikipedia and its struggles to maintain its 
quality as an open platform over time.163 
The conclusion to draw from this discussion is that, while open 
platforms can generate consumer benefits, there is no ex ante reason 
to believe that a particular platform will do so merely because it is 
open. To the contrary, closed platforms can prove more valuable 
than open ones. 
The second point to make about the “preservation” of the open 
Internet is that the Internet simply is not, and never has been, an open 
platform in the sense that net neutrality advocates take it to be.164 The 
TCP/IP stack incorporates many design decisions and compromises 
that were made that either expressly or incidentally improve or 
degrade the performance of different types of applications or 
different users based upon how they connect to the network.165 
Moreover, many of these decisions were made based upon the 
characteristics of then-available computer hardware—they would 
likely have been made differently and have had different 
consequences given today’s technology and uses of the network. 
This fundamental point has been made clearly and strongly by 
several research scientists that were intimately involved with the 
development of the Internet. This is best seen with David Clark. 
Quoting from a 2009 Communications Daily interview with Clark, 
Hazlett and Wright recount Clark’s description of the early Internet: 
“‘The network is not neutral and never has been,’ Clark said, dismissing as 
‘happy little bunny rabbit dreams’ the assumptions of net neutrality 
                                                                                                                
the Internet, and to a large potential undercounting of ‘digital dark matter’ in 
general.”). 
 162.  See Rolfe Winkler, Android’s ‘Open’ System Has Limits, WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Feb. 12, 2014, 8:06 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304888404579378850231234912. 
 163. For discussion of the open platforms’ questionable reliance on ongoing 
input and support from third parties, see Jonathan M Smith et al., Experiences 
Enhancing Open Source Security in the POSSE Project, in FREE/OPEN SOURCE 
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 242, 244-45 (Stefan Koch ed., 2005). 
 164. Jon Crowcroft, Net Neutrality: The Technical Side of the Debate—a 
White Paper, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 567, 579 (2007). 
 165. This can also be seen again in the comparative history of the OSI and 
TCP/IP protocol stacks. See Russell, supra note 156 (discussing that TCP/IP 
prevailed over the OSI model as “growing numbers began using TCP/IP to meet the 
practical near-term pressures” and noting that “‘openness’ is full of contradictions. 
OSI brought to light the deep incompatibility between idealistic visions of openness 
and the political and economic realities”). 
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supporters that there was once a ‘Garden of Eden’ for the Internet. 
NSFnet, an early part of the Internet backbone, gave priority to interactive 
traffic, he said: ‘You’ve got to discriminate between good blocking and 
bad blocking.’”166 
Similarly, Jon Crowcroft explains “the basic realities of the net, 
which has never been a level playing field for many accidental and 
some deliberate reasons,” concluding that “[w]e never had network 
neutrality in the past, and I do not believe we should engineer for it 
in the future either.”167 Others have made this same point from the 
early years of the FCC’s involvement in net neutrality.168 
Much of the discussion about the open Internet—including the 
proposed rules—focus on openness qua neutral treatment of users, 
applications, and data by the network.169 As this is a more 
constrained understanding of openness than much of the innovation 
literature cited above, it is useful to note—as Clark, Crowcroft, and 
others also do—that discrimination in the handling of packets has 
long been discussed as desirable or necessary in development of the 
technical standards under which the Internet operates.170 Similarly, 
                                                     
 166. Thomas W. Hazlett & Joshua D. Wright, The Law and Economics of 
Network Neutrality, 45 IND. L. REV. 767, 785 (2012) (quoting Greg Piper, Internet 
Architect Suggests “Futures Market” to Avoid Policy Disputes, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 
5, 2009, at 1 (quoting David Clark)).  
 167. Crowcroft, supra note 164, at 567, 579. 
 168. Douglas A. Hass, Note, The Never-Was-Neutral Net and Why Informed 
End Users Can End the Net Neutrality Debates, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1565, 
1566-67, 1575-86 (2007). 
 169. See id. at 1570-75. 
 170. See, e.g., Memorandum from S. Blake et al. to Network Working Grp. 3 
(Dec. 1998), available at https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2475.txt (“Service 
differentiation is desired to accommodate heterogeneous application requirements 
and user expectations, and to permit differentiated pricing of Internet service.”); 
Memorandum from K. Nichols, V. Jacobson & L. Zhang to Network Working Grp. 
4 (July 1999), available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2638 (discussing paid 
prioritization, saying, “[i]t is expected that Premium traffic would be allocated a 
small percentage of the total network capacity, but that it would be priced much 
higher”); Memorandum from R. Braden, D. Clark & S. Shenker to Network 
Working Grp. 2, 4, 5 (June 1994), available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1633 
(“[R]eal-time applications often do not work well across the Internet because of 
variable queuing delays and congestion losses. The Internet, as originally conceived, 
offers only a very simple quality of service (QoS), point-to-point best-effort data 
delivery. Before real-time applications such as remote video, multimedia 
conferencing, visualization, and virtual reality can be broadly used, the Internet 
infrastructure must be modified to support real-time QoS, which provides some 
control over end-to-end packet delays. . . . The first assumption is that resources 
(e.g., bandwidth) must be explicitly managed in order to meet application 
requirements. . . . An alternative approach, which we reject, is to attempt to support 
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research demonstrates that so-called “non-neutral” treatment can be 
affirmatively desirable.171  
2. Vertical Integration 
The literature on vertical integration is related to the literature 
on innovation and openness—and many of the concerns raised by the 
Order can be expressed in terms of vertical integration. For instance, 
much of the Order is concerned with how a vertically integrated 
content and distribution firm treats its own traffic compared to that of 
its competitors.172 These are unquestionably valid concerns—indeed, 
the widest range of potentially problematic conduct is already 
proscribed by antitrust law,173 such that further regulation by the 
                                                                                                                
real-time traffic without any explicit changes to the Internet service model. The 
essence of real-time service is the requirement for some service guarantees, and we 
argue that guarantees cannot be achieved without reservations. . . . We conclude that 
there is an inescapable requirement for routers to be able to reserve resources, in 
order to provide special QoS for specific user packet streams, or ‘flows.’”).  
 171. See, e.g., RICHARD T.B. MA ET AL., ON COOPERATIVE SETTLEMENT 
BETWEEN CONTENT, TRANSIT AND EYEBALL INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS (2008), 
available at http://dna-pubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/172/CoNEXT08.pdf 
(“[W]e ¿nd the justi¿cation of the existence of paid-peering between transit 
ISPs. . . . Our previous work . . . showed that . . . selfish ISPs have incentives to 
perform globally optimal routing and interconnecting decisions to reach an 
equilibrium that maximizes both individual profit and global social welfare. . . . In 
this paper we extend our model. . . . Our result [finds instances where paid-peering 
can benefit welfare].”); David D. Clark, Network Neutrality: Words of Power and 
800-Pound Gorillas, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 701, 705-06 (2007) (“As a technical 
mechanism, QoS seems to be beneficial. It directly addresses the real performance 
requirements of different sorts of Internet traffic. . . . This reality begs the question 
of whether we can find a set of rules that might distinguish between ‘good’ or 
‘acceptable’ forms of discrimination, and ‘bad’ discrimination. Unless we can find a 
bright line, using regulation of discrimination to define acceptable behavior may 
cause more trouble than it cures.”).  
 172. See Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 
5606, 5609-10 (2014). 
 173. See, e.g., Hazlett & Wright, supra note 166, at 7-8 (“At its heart, the 
Net Neutrality Order seeks to prohibit broadband providers from entering into 
vertical contractual relationships out of fear that they have an incentive to 
disadvantage rivals and ultimately harm competition. . . . Students of antitrust will 
recognize that these economic concerns are identical to those animating antitrust 
rules governing vertical relationships.”); JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, NET NEUTRALITY: IS 
ANTITRUST LAW MORE EFFECTIVE THAN REGULATION IN PROTECTING CONSUMERS 
AND INNOVATION? 2, 4-5 (2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/409571/140620antitrusttestimony.pdf (prepared 
statement of Joshua Wright, Comm’r, Federal Trade Commission) (“At its heart, the 
net neutrality debate concerns the competitive effects of vertical contractual 
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Commission would largely be duplicative and generally 
unwarranted.  
Nonetheless, the economic literature of vertical integration 
provides useful guidance for the Commission to consider. As with 
the literature on open platforms and innovation, the conclusions 
relating to vertical integration are consistently ambiguous.174 Most 
vertical integration can harm consumers, but most vertical 
integration also can benefit consumers. Importantly, in practice, 
firms generally vertically integrate to capture efficiencies, and in so 
doing, such integration ultimately benefits consumers.175 As 
explained by Federal Trade Commission Commissioner and 
Professor of Law and Economics Josh Wright, “[o]ver a century of 
antitrust jurisprudence, economic study, and enforcement agency 
practice have produced a well-understood economic analysis of the 
competitive effects of a vertically integrated firm’s ‘discrimination’ 
in favor of its own products or services, including widespread 
recognition that such arrangements generally produce significant 
benefits for consumers.”176 
One of the most illustrative examples of misplaced concerns 
about vertical integration leading to harmful regulatory intervention 
is the Supreme Court’s 1948 Paramount case in which the Court 
broke up the vertically integrated movie production and distribution 
industry.177 Subsequent decades of analysis have not been kind to this 
action, finding that the vertical disintegration led to, inter alia, higher 
ticket prices for consumers, reduced variety and quality of films 
being produced, substantial loss of jobs within the movie industry, 
and, generally, the end of the golden age of Hollywood and the 
                                                                                                                
arrangements between broadband providers and content providers. . . . This type of 
competitive concern is grounded in antitrust economics. . . . In light of the economic 
evidence, in my view, antitrust offers a superior analytical framework . . . to address 
potential anticompetitive conduct in the broadband sector.”). 
 174. James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of 
Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 643 (2005). 
 175. See, e.g., id. at 658 (surveying the literature and finding the vast 
majority of studies find vertical integration to have procompetitive effects).  
 176. Joshua D. Wright, Defining and Measuring Search Bias: Some 
Preliminary Evidence 5 (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 12-14, 2011). 
 177. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 140-41 (1948). 
See also Ricard Gil, Does Vertical Integration Decrease Prices? Evidence from the 
Paramount Antitrust Case of 1948, 7 AM. ECON. J: ECON. POL. 162 (2015), 
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.20120245. 
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beginning of a multi-decade dark age.178 One of the central reasons 
for this is that vertical integration allowed firms to better absorb risk 
and to better capture the returns on risky investment; conversely, the 
vertically disintegrated firms faced greater exposure to risk and less 
ability to capture the rewards of risky investment. The result was a 
substantial reduction in innovation in the industry: Vertical 
integration can be a key ingredient for basic research, development, 
and innovation. 
3. Multi-Sided Markets 
A final area of literature relates to multi-sided markets: markets 
in which two or more groups of users interact with one another by 
means of some platform.179 The Internet is a prototypical example of 
a multi-sided market, with ISPs and backbone providers acting as 
platforms that facilitate the interaction between end users and edge 
providers. To not needlessly belabor the point, as with the prior 
examples, the relevant literature yields consistently inconsistent 
results. In multi-sided markets, prohibiting platforms from engaging 
in discriminatory pricing can yield either consumer benefits or 
harm.180 
                                                     
 178. See F. Andrew Hanssen, Vertical Integration During the Hollywood 
Studio Era, 53 J.L. & ECON. 519, 520 (2010).  
 179. See generally Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: 
A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006); see also supra note 158 
(collecting a sample of literature applying multi-sided market analysis to network 
neutrality). 
 180. The literature here is voluminous, often demonstrates benefits from 
non-neutrality, and consistently notes ambiguous results. For some examples (most 
of which cite to the broader literature), see Nicholas Economides & Joacim Tåg, 
Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market Analysis, 24 INFO. ECON. & 
POL’Y 91, 100 (2012) (“We have showed that one can find such parameter ranges 
both in the monopoly model and in the duopoly model suggesting that network 
neutrality regulation could be warranted even when some competition is present in 
the platform market. However, the overall effect of implementing network neutrality 
regulations can still be both positive and negative depending on parameter values.” 
(emphasis added)); Paul Njoroge et al., Investment in Two-Sided Markets and the 
Net Neutrality Debate, 12 REV. NETWORK ECON. 355, 356, 398 (2013) (“This paper 
adds to the growing body of formal economic analysis that will help inform policy 
makers on the net neutrality debate and sheds light on the validity, or lack thereof, of 
the arguments proposed by the different advocacy groups involved. In particular, 
this article develops a game theoretic model based on a two-sided market framework 
. . . to investigate the effects of a net neutrality mandate on investment incentives of 
ISPs, and its concomitant effects on social welfare, consumer and CP surplus, and 
CP market participation. . . . Regarding social welfare, the main conclusion drawn 
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The examples discussed above make abundantly clear the 
indeterminacy inherent in any Open Internet rules. It is difficult, if 
not impossible, to know ex ante whether any given business model 
or type of conduct by online intermediaries will be beneficial or 
harmful to consumers. Any rules that mandate or foreclose certain 
practices or conduct on an ex ante basis would therefore be, of 
necessity, arbitrary or capricious. The converse, however, is also 
true: It is possible that certain practices or conduct can harm 
consumers, such that the Commission must develop an approach to 
the regulation of the Internet that allows it to take action where 
action is, in fact, necessary. 
This suggests that the Commission should prefer to adopt 
general standards over clear rules. The legal basis for such an 
approach is discussed in the next Subsection.  
Before turning to that discussion, it is useful to urge here that, 
should the Commission adopt clear rules, it must affirmatively 
embrace and discuss the relevant economic literature to explain why 
a rule of general applicability is in the public interest. Given the 
uncertain consumer-welfare effects that run throughout the relevant 
literature, the Commission must affirmatively address these concerns 
in order to avoid judicial challenge for any rules that it adopts. 
Indeed, such challenge will likely be warranted, given the 
arbitrariness such rules would demonstrate. More problematic, such 
a legal challenge would almost certainly result in further years of 
consumer doubt and uncertainty relating to net neutrality, which 
would cause concomitant consumer harm. 
                                                                                                                
from the theoretical model is that it is larger under the non-neutral regime. The 
numerical experiments across the different models in general add support to this 
finding. As discussed earlier, this fact is driven by the higher investments in the non-
neutral regime, which increase the gross value gained by both CPs and consumers.” 
(footnote omitted)); Jay Pil Choi & Byung-Cheol Kim, Net Neutrality and 
Investment Incentives, 41 RAND J. ECON. 446, 448, 457, 466 (2010) (“Considering 
all three channels through which net neutrality can have an influence upon short-run 
total welfare, we can conclude that static welfare implications of net neutrality 
regulations depend on the tradeoff between transportation cost saving and inefficient 
production. If the margin difference is significantly large relative to the degree of 
product differentiation, the discriminatory network would be preferred from the 
viewpoint of social welfare.” “We thus find that the relationship between net 
neutrality regulation and investment incentives for network operators and 
application/content providers is subtle. . . . Even though we cannot draw general 
unambiguous conclusions, we identified key effects that are expected to play 
important roles in the assessment of net neutrality regulations.”). 
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B. The Reality of the Technology: Statistical Multiplexing and 
Discrimination 
The next subject to consider is the technological reality of net 
neutrality—and, in particular, of prioritization and paid-
prioritization. These issues are addressed from a technical 
perspective, focusing on statistical multiplexing—the basic means by 
which multiple users and applications are able to share Internet 
facilities. Importantly, many advocates for strong Open Internet rules 
assert that prioritization necessarily means a reduction in capacity 
available for non-prioritized services181—and this is a view that the 
FCC, erroneously, embraced in the Open Internet Order.182 From a 
technical perspective, this understanding is simply not correct. This 
Section explains why and offers other policy implications derived 
from the technical mechanisms controlling how data is sent over the 
Internet. 
1. A Brief Primer: Statistical Multiplexing, Congestion, and 
Queue Management183 
The Internet is a shared facility. The basic mechanism by 
which the Internet works is that human-understandable information 
that is to be communicated between endpoints is digitized and 
broken into small packets. These packets are sent over a shared 
                                                     
 181. See, e.g., PAID PRIORITIZATION: THE ANTITHESIS OF OPENNESS ON THE 
INTERNET (n.d.), available at http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-
legacy/Paid_Prioritization.pdf (“[T]he routing of IP data is a zero-sum game. If a 
router speeds up one set of bits, by definition, all other bits are slowed down.”); S. 
Derek Turner, Beware of the Straw Man, SAVE THE INTERNET, 
http://www.savetheinternet.com/blog/2014/05/13/beware-straw-man (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2015) (“[T]he routing of IP data is a zero-sum game.”); CHRIS RILEY & 
ALEX FOWLER, COMMENTS OF MOZILLA 20 (2014), available at 
https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/files/2014/07/Mozilla-NN-Comments-July-2014. 
pdf (“[P]aid prioritization is inherently different from paid interconnection or 
peering practices and from content delivery networks, because it is zero-sum. . . . 
Prioritization is inherently a zero-sum practice, and inherently creates fast and slow 
lanes . . . .”). 
 182. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 2015 WL 1120110, ¶ 126, 
at *37 (2015). 
 183. The discussion that follows is meant to give a general sense of 
complicated technical concepts in order to demonstrate their importance to the Open 
Internet discussion. Some liberties have been taken as to precise technical 
descriptions in order to make the discussion reasonably accessible to a generalist 
audience. 
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communications infrastructure that routes them from a sender to a 
receiver; the receiver reassembles the packets and converts them 
back into human-understandable form. This is generally called a 
“packet switching” network, referring to the use of packetized data to 
communicate between endpoints.184 
But the packetization of data isn’t the only basic feature of the 
Internet. Once data is packetized, it needs to be communicated across 
the network. This is done by a process known as statistical 
multiplexing.185 The basic idea behind statistical multiplexing is that 
a significant portion of any communications channel goes unused by 
any given application. For instance, a typical voice conversation 
consists of more silence (gaps between sounds made by the speakers) 
than speech. Other applications can make opportunistic use of that 
capacity without adversely affecting the initial application. Statistical 
multiplexing is the mechanism by which unused capacity by one 
communications channel is shared by other communications 
channels.186 This has two general benefits. First, without statistical 
multiplexing, five “conversations” would require five 
communications channels; with statistical multiplexing, those five 
conversations can be accommodated by two, or perhaps three, 
communications channels. This reduces the cost and complexity of a 
communications network. And second, this allows individual 
“conversations” access to much greater capacity during periods of 
relative quiet on the network. 
Packetization and statistical multiplexing are closely related: 
Packet switching is the mechanism that makes statistical 
multiplexing possible on the Internet. Prior to the advent of packet 
switching, telecommunications services used either circuit-switched 
or dedicated lines. Under this model, lines were allocated to specific 
users for specific periods of time. As a result, they could not be 
shared between other simultaneous users. Packet switching changed 
                                                     
 184. For a general history of packet switching and its relationship to the 
Internet, see Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y, 
http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/brief-history-
internet (last visited Aug. 11, 2015). 
 185. Damon Wischik, Mark Handley & Marcelo Bagnulo Braun, The 
Resource Pooling Principle, COMPUTER COMM. REV., Oct. 2008, at 47, 48 
(“Statistical multiplexing through packet switching is the most fundamental concept 
in the Internet architecture.”). 
 186. One of the seminal articles in the field is Paul T. Brady, A Statistical 
Analysis of On-Off Patterns in 16 Conversations, 47 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 73 (1968) 
(finding that more than 60% of speaking time in telephone conversations is silence, 
suggesting that 60% of a channel’s capacity could be used for other purposes). 
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this, allowing for a much finer-grained level of sharing on a purely 
statistical basis.  
The benefits of statistical multiplexing are immense. Because 
most communication is “bursty,” few applications need the full 
capacity of a dedicated communications channel. Statistical 
multiplexing therefore allows substantially more aggregate capacity 
to be offered to a group of users than would otherwise be possible if 
each user was allocated a dedicated communications channel. 
Conversely, any additional capacity added to a network to benefit 
one or a small group of users also creates additional capacity for all 
other users. Thus, because statistical multiplexing allows users to 
opportunistically use other users’ unused capacity, incremental 
capacity benefits all users.  
Statistical multiplexing is implemented primarily by two 
mechanisms: the algorithms that individual computers use to 
determine the rate at which they inject packets into the network 
(“congestion avoidance” algorithms), and the algorithms that routers 
use to sort and prioritize packets (“queu[ing] disciplines”).187 
Queuing disciplines are particularly important. As routers receive 
packets from multiple sources, they store those packets in temporary 
buffers before processing them to be sent to their destination. Early 
routers would process packets in the order that they arrived (i.e., on a 
first-in-first-out (FIFO) basis) (Figure 1); if buffers were full, the 
router would drop any incoming packets (i.e., on a “tail-drop” 
basis).188 On naïve inspection, this appears to be a fair (even 
“neutral”!) approach to handling traffic. In practice, however, FIFO 
and drop-tail algorithms can result in some streams getting a 
disproportionate share of available capacity, other streams being 
locked out of getting any capacity at all, and overall inefficient levels 
of network utilization. 
 
                                                     
 187. See generally Memorandum from B. Braden et al. to Network Working 
Grp. (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2309.txt. The term 
“queuing discipline” used here encompasses both queue management and 
scheduling algorithms.  
 188. See id. at 3-4. 




Given these concerns, engineers have been developing various 
active-queuing disciplines—generally referred to as Active Queue 
Management (AQM)—for decades.189 AQM algorithms allow routers 
to adopt different approaches to managing queues and dropping 
packets as buffers reach capacity in order to ensure “fair”190 and 
efficient network operation. This is the mechanism by which “paid 
prioritization” is most likely to be implemented: ISPs can configure 
their routers to handle prioritized data specially. For instance, 
prioritized traffic can be moved to the head of the queue. Or, more 
often, prioritized traffic will be placed in a separate queue, from 
which packets will be processed more often than from other queues 
(Figure 2).191 
                                                     
 189. See, e.g., Sally Floyd & Van Jacobson, Random Early Detection 
Gateways for Congestion Avoidance, 1 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 
397, 397 (1993). 
 190. “Fair” is a term of art, referring to how congestion-control algorithms 
and router-queuing disciplines interact to apportion bandwidth on a shared resource. 
There are multiple definitions and no consensus definition. Generally, “fairness” 
means that, on a connection shared by N connections, no connection will prevent 
any other connection from being able to use at least 1/N of the overall capacity. 
 191. Importantly, queuing disciplines alone cannot efficiently guarantee an 
equal allocation of bandwidth among streams. Bandwidth allocation is governed by 
many factors, including congestion on other parts of the network, latency and 
packet-round-trip time, and congestion algorithm. Certain queuing disciplines 
attempt to ensure equal bandwidth between streams; while such disciplines can 
increase the share of bandwidth allocated to lower-speed streams (e.g., those that 
take longer to reach a steady-state packet rate due to relatively higher round-trip 





Under any queuing discipline, congestion occurs in one of two 
ways: Packets are either dropped, or they are delayed. Drops occur 
either when a router’s buffer space is full or when the network 
connection between devices is at capacity (e.g., trying to transmit 
data at a rate of 15 mbps for a sustained period over a connection 
only capable of transmitting 10 mbps).192  
                                                                                                                
times), they often accomplish this at the cost of disproportionately slowing other 
streams. See, e.g., Memorandum from J. Babiarz, K. Chan & F. Baker to Network 
Working Grp. 6 (Aug. 2006), available at https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4594 
(explaining that, under the DiffServ prioritization model, “[a] priority queuing 
system is a combination of a set of queues and a scheduler that empties them in 
priority sequence”). 
 192. In practice, these cases are generally equivalent today. This is because 
most devices are on one of two types of connection. Either they are on switched 
ports, meaning that there is only a single sender/receiver pair on each connection, or 
they are on an asymmetric shared connection with a single gateway (e.g., the 
CMTS). In that case, devices on the shared connection may interfere with one 
another, resulting in loss of packets sent to the gateway. However, the bulk of data is 
typically being sent in the other direction, from the gateway to devices on the shared 
connection (e.g., from edge providers, through the CMTS, to end-users). Where this 
is the case, the gateway is the only transmitter, so drops are likely to result as data 
from edge providers arrives at a rate exceeding the capacity of the shared 
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Delays occur when packets arrive at a router faster than the 
router can send them to their destination. Where this happens, the 
router buffers packets until it can process them. Such delays most 
often occur because Internet traffic is “bursty,” meaning that packets 
from a given sender tend to arrive at a router in groups—not because 
the destination network has insufficient capacity to handle the data to 
be sent over it. As an example, if we assume a router with ten 100 
mbps ports (and symmetric traffic patterns across all ports), with 
average utilization of 40 mbps per port, it is likely that the rate of 
incoming traffic to each port will regularly exceed several hundred 
mbps for very short periods of time. Without buffering, this would 
result in substantial packet loss (i.e., dropped packets); with 
buffering, the router can queue several hundred or thousand packets 
(or more) received over, e.g., milliseconds to tens of milliseconds 
and send them back out over a period of, e.g., tens of milliseconds to 
hundreds of milliseconds. Most applications are not particularly 
sensitive to delays—and even those that are can generally tolerate 
the moderate variances that are typically seen on actual networks—
so it is often preferable to address congestion with buffering instead 
of by dropping packets.193 
Another example is particularly illustrative, as it demonstrates 
a common instance where buffers may be overrun, resulting in 
packet loss. The MPEG-DASH protocol, which is used by services 
like Netflix to stream video with adaptive bitrates, sends video in 
chunks (commonly in units of ten seconds of video each).194 This 
                                                                                                                
connection; in which case, the gateway will buffer packets until its buffers are 
exhausted, at which point it will begin dropping packets. 
 193. But note, this is not always the case—proper tuning of buffer sizes is a 
difficult and technical topic. See, e.g., Jim Gettys & Kathleen Nichols, Bufferbloat: 
Dark Buffers in the Internet, ACM QUEUE, Nov. 2011, at 57. Additionally, while it 
may be preferable to address ongoing congestion by buffering instead of dropping 
packets, congestion avoidance is often best implemented by responding to delay. 
There is longstanding research and debate within the technical community over 
congestion-control algorithms that rely on packet loss (e.g., TCP Reno) vs. packet 
delay (TCP Vegas). See, e.g., Lukasz Budzisz et al., On the Fair Coexistence of 
Loss- and Delay-Based TCP, 19 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 1811, 
1811 (2011). 
 194. For discussions of MPEG-DASH relevant to this and the next 
paragraph, see Ahmed Mansy, Bill Ver Steeg & Mostafa Ammar, SABRE: A Client 
Based Technique for Mitigating the Buffer Bloat Effect of Adaptive Video Flows, 
2013 PROCS. 4TH ACM MULTIMEDIA SYS. CONF. 214, 215 (“[W]e show . . . that a 
single DASH stream can cause significant delays to other ongoing applications 
sharing the home network in a typical residential setting.”); Jim Martin et al., 
Characterizing Netflix Bandwidth Consumption, 2013 CONSUMER COMM. & 
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typically results in an ON/OFF transmit pattern, where video is sent 
from the server to the client for about ten seconds, and then sends 
nothing for about ten seconds. Researchers are only just starting to 
understand how this protocol, which transmits for relatively large 
bursts, interacts with router buffering and TCP’s congestion-control 
algorithm. While on average data is being sent to a steady number of 
clients at a constant data rate, statistically there will be periods where 
either far more or far fewer than the average number of segments are 
being simultaneously sent. When more than the average number of 
segments are simultaneously sent, given the size of each segment, 
there is a potential to saturate router buffers and cause packet-loss 
congestion. Such congestion may give the appearance that the 
network is under-provisioned by the network operator when in fact it 
                                                                                                                
NETWORKING CONF. 230, 230, 235 (“Ongoing academic research is providing 
foundations for understanding how DASH applications behave and how they might 
be improved. . . . [W]e seek to understand the impact of adaptive applications on 
congestion and bandwidth control mechanisms throughout the Internet or within a 
broadband access network. The work presented in this paper provides foundations 
for achieving this goal.” “[Academic research on DASH is just emerging]. The 
dynamics and implications of multiple levels of end-to-end congestion control are 
not well understood.”); Saamer Akhshabi, Ali C. Begen & Constantine Dovrolis, An 
Experimental Evaluation of Rate-Adaptation Algorithms in Adaptive Streaming over 
HTTP, 2011 PROCS. 2D ACM MULTIMEDIA SYS. CONF. 157, 158 (“Adaptive 
streaming over HTTP is a new technology. It is not yet clear whether the existing 
commercial players perform well, especially under dynamic network conditions. 
Further, the complex interactions between TCP’s congestion control and the 
application’s rate-adaptation mechanisms create a ‘nested double feedback loop’ - 
the dynamics of such interacting control systems can be notoriously complex and 
hard to predict.”); Te-Yuan Huang et al., Confused, Timid, and Unstable: Picking a 
Video Streaming Rate Is Hard, 2012 PROCS. 2012 ACM CONF. ON INTERNET 
MEASUREMENT 225, 237 (“[A]ll three [MPEG-DASH] services we study display 
degraded performance in the presence of competing traƥc, well below the video 
quality possible if the client used its fair share of bandwidth.”); Te-Yuan Huang, A 
Buffer-Based Approach to Video Rate Adaptation 23 (June 2014) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) [hereinafter Huang, A Buffer-Based 
Approach], available at http://yuba.stanford.edu/~nickm/papers/ty-thesis.pdf (“In 
the worst case, the feedback loop creates a ‘death spiral’ and brings the playback 
rate all the way down to its lowest value.”); Junchen Jiang, Vyas Sekar & Hui 
Zhang, Improving Fairness, Ef¿ciency, and Stability in HTTP-Based Adaptive Video 
Streaming with FESTIVE, 2012 PROCS. 8TH INT’L CONF. ON EMERGING NETWORKING 
EXPERIMENTS & TECHS. 97, 97 (“Many commercial video players rely on bitrate 
adaptation logic to adapt the bitrate in response to changing network conditions. Past 
measurement studies have identified issues with today’s commercial players with 
respect to three key metrics—efficiency, fairness, and stability—when multiple 
bitrate-adaptive players share a bottleneck link. Unfortunately, our current 
understanding of why these effects occur and how they can be mitigated is quite 
limited.”). 
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is largely the result of application-level attempts at congestion 
control; additionally, while it will adversely affect all traffic being 
sent over the shared link, it is likely to affect some traffic more 
adversely than other traffic, potentially giving the appearance of 
discriminatory treatment.195  
Critically, from the perspective of the Commission’s Open 
Internet efforts, this demonstrates the limits of our understanding of 
the basic technologies that the FCC is attempting to regulate. It is 
difficult to imagine that the Commission can implement an ex ante 
regulatory regime that yields an efficient allocation of these 
resources given the current state of knowledge about how these 
resources work. The interaction between MPEG-DASH, router 
queuing, and congestion control is a current area of cutting-edge 
research. Current research suggests that traditional best-effort non-
prioritized routing may yield substantially inefficient use of the 
network resource. It may well turn out to be the case that efficient 
routing of data like streaming video requires router-based 
prioritization. It may even turn out that efficient routing of streaming 
video data is necessarily harmful to other data—it may not be 
possible to implement a single network architecture that efficiently 
handles data with differentiated characteristics. If this is the case, 
then it may certainly be “commercially reasonable” that streaming-
video providers pay a premium for the efficient handling of their data 
in order to compensate for the negative externalities that those uses 
impose upon other users and uses. 
2. Prioritization, Congestion, and (Not So) Slow Lanes 
To date, no firm is known to have offered a paid-prioritization 
service of the sort contemplated by the Order.196 It is, therefore, not 
entirely clear what such a service would look like or how it would be 
implemented. While necessarily speculative—again demonstrating 
the danger of adopting strong ex ante rules—in all likelihood a paid-
prioritization model would be implemented through priority 
buffering as described above: A firm would pay to have its packets 
handled on a priority basis by another firm’s routers.  
                                                     
 195. See, e.g., Huang, A Buffer-Based Approach, supra note 194, at 23 
(describing the performance “death spiral” that services using MPEG-DASH (such 
as Netflix) can experience under congestion circumstances). 
 196. ADTRAN, REPLY COMMENTS OF ADTRAN, INC. (2014), available at 
http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=6019125300. 
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Prioritization can affect connections in one of two ways: by 
increasing or decreasing that connection’s bandwidth, and by 
increasing or decreasing its delay. The primary effect of 
prioritization is to decrease a prioritized connection’s delay; this 
follows from the basic prioritization mechanism of handling 
incoming packets via a priority queue. Unsurprisingly, this can 
increase the delay to which non-prioritized packets are subjected. 
This increased delay197 is unlikely to meaningfully affect most 
applications. While some applications are particularly sensitive to 
delay, delay is a persistent technical reality. All applications are 
subject to delay, and most are not sensitive to it; all delay-sensitive 
applications are designed to accept and mitigate delay as best they 
can. Any increase in delay caused by prioritization is likely to be 
marginal and fall within the accepted margins of typical delay-
sensitive applications. Moreover, because delay is a persistent 
technical problem that is only exacerbated, not created, by 
prioritization, a better approach to delay mitigation is the wide-scale 
implementation of application-controlled or automated-prioritization 
(e.g., Quality of Service (QoS)) mechanisms by routers. These 
mechanisms—many of which already exist but are infrequently 
implemented—allow routers to prioritize delay-sensitive traffic. 
Wide-scale implementation of these mechanisms would broadly 
address any concerns raised by the adverse effects of paid-
prioritization on delay-sensitive applications. 
Prioritization would also affect how much bandwidth 
competing streams are able to use. Assuming the network is 
uncongested—as recent research makes clear is the case on most 
consumer-Internet backbones198—prioritization would allow a 
prioritized connection to consume more bandwidth. But, 
counterintuitively and contrary to the understanding of many net 
                                                     
 197. This discussion does not differentiate between “delay” and “changes in 
delay” (technically known as jitter). For some applications, especially streaming 
media, jitter is more problematic than delay. Prioritization would likely yield similar 
effects for both delay and jitter, though the precise effects are ambiguous.  
 198. See David Clark et al., Measurement and Analysis of Internet 
Interconnection and Congestion 11 (Sept. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2417573 (finding 
no widespread or persistent congestion on backbone interconnection points; rather, 
observed congestion resulted from changing business arrangements); MEASUREMENT 
LAB CONSORTIUM, ISP INTERCONNECTION AND ITS IMPACT ON CONSUMER INTERNET 
PERFORMANCE 4 (2014), available at http://www.measurementlab.net/static/ 
observatory/M-Lab_Interconnection_Study_US.pdf (finding that congestion 
incidents are related to business relationships, not technological capacity). 
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neutrality advocates, prioritization would not appreciably affect the 
bandwidth available to other connections.  
This follows from the interaction of queuing disciplines and 
congestion avoidance in statistically multiplexed systems. Almost 
every implementation of TCP in use today uses packet loss, not 
delay, to control its data rate.199 End hosts on the Internet do not 
know how much bandwidth is available to them, so they have no 
way of knowing at any given time what speed they should send data 
at.200 What they do instead is start sending data at a slow speed and 
incrementally increase that speed until congestion occurs (e.g., 
packets are dropped). At that point, they know they have exceeded 
available capacity, so they slow down (usually by reducing transmit 
rate by half); they then resume incrementally increasing their speed. 
This process, known as “congestion avoidance,” repeats 
indefinitely.201 
Because congestion-avoidance algorithms primarily rely on 
packet loss to signal congestion, so long as a network is not 
experiencing packet loss, prioritization will not substantially affect 
the rate at which end hosts send packets.202 Thus, and directly 
                                                     
 199. Standard implementations of TCP used by all major operating systems 
rely on the packet-loss mechanism. Delay-oriented congestion-control algorithms 
also exist but are less frequently used—largely because they are systematically 
unable to make as efficient use of the network resource in a system shared with 
packet-loss-oriented TCPs. See, e.g., Budzisz et al., supra note 193, at 1811. The 
great exception to this is recent versions of Windows, which uses a hybrid loss and 
delay-based algorithm (Compound TCP). Even under congestion, however, 
Compound TCP is bounded on the low end by the performance of the standard Reno 
loss-based algorithm. 
 200. This is a fundamental constraint of the Internet. Since no one can know, 
ex ante, how many users will be sharing a connection at a given time, one can never 
know how much bandwidth is available to a given user at a given time—even if all 
of the technical characteristics of the network are known (which they are not). For 
instance, if three users share a 100 mbps connection but only two are active at a 
given time, a “fair” TCP will let each of them use 50 mbps. If the third user then 
starts using the connection, only 33 mbps will be allocated to each. There is no way 
to know whether or when other users will be making use of the shared resource. 
 201. This process, known as “additive increase / multiplicative decrease” 
(AIMD), was first described in Van Jacobson, Congestion Avoidance and Control, 
COMPUTER COMM. REV., Aug. 1988, at 314, 321. 
 202. The rate at which TCPs increase the rate at which they send data is 
affected by delay, so there is some marginal effect on speed that results from 
prioritization. This is, however, a second-order effect, so it is bounded by a 
relatively small margin, even in the case of a linear increment. Modern TCPs 
increasingly use non-linear recovery mechanisms (e.g., CUBIC, New Reno, 
Compound TCP), for which a marginal increase in delay is unlikely to substantially 
affect average transmission rates. For a comparison of several of these algorithms, 
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contrary to the claims of many advocates, prioritization of some 
connections does not reduce the capacity available to other 
connections. Or, if we use the rhetoric of the debate, on connections 
without substantial packet loss, the hypothetical addition of “fast 
lanes” (prioritized connections) does not relegate other connections 
to a “slow lane.”  
This discussion suggests several conclusions relating to the 
Order’s concerns about prioritization. 
First and foremost, the effects of prioritization should be 
measured primarily in terms of on-net packet loss, and, in particular, 
the relative levels of packet loss between prioritized and non-
prioritized traffic. If these rates are similar (including the case where 
they are at or near zero), this strongly suggests that any prioritization 
is commercially reasonable. Indeed, it strongly suggests that 
prioritization is not affecting non-prioritized traffic at all. In cases 
where there is substantial packet loss but the rates are comparable 
between prioritized and non-prioritized traffic, this suggests the 
relevant network is under-provisioned—but it does not suggest 
concerns relating to prioritization or Open Internet principles 
generally. 
The only situation where prioritization on uncongested 
networks may reasonably be seen as adversely affecting non-
prioritized connections is where those connections are substantially 
delay-sensitive. In such cases, network providers implementing paid 
prioritization should take steps to ensure such applications are not 
unduly affected. Such steps could take many forms: from user-
selectable prioritization, to automated (e.g., Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI)-based) prioritization of delay-sensitive traffic, to other router-
based QoS mechanisms (e.g., tuning the rate at which prioritized 
buffers are serviced relative to non-prioritized buffers). These and 
similar ideas have long been discussed within the technical 
community as important to efficient network use;203 paid 
prioritization may reasonably increase the urgency of their 
                                                                                                                
see generally Habibullah Jamal & Kiran Sultan, Performance Analysis of TCP 
Congestion Control Algorithms, 2 INT’L J. COMPUTERS & COMM. 30 (2008). 
 203. One need only look at the specification for the TCP protocol as 
developed in the late 1970s to see this. The specification expressly includes a “Type 
of Service” field to all packets to be given “precedence, delay, throughput, and 
reliability” treatment by routers. See INFO. SCIS. INST., RFC 791, INTERNET 
PROTOCOL: DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION 28 (1981), 
available at https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt. As noted in RFC 791, the 
predecessor to the Internet, ARPANET, offered similar functionality. 
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deployment. Given the (small, but hard to define) range of possible 
applications that could be adversely affected by prioritization, the 
uncertain ways and extent to which they may actually be affected in 
any particular case, and the myriad approaches to mitigating such 
effects, the Commission should address any concerns arising from 
prioritization on a case-by-case basis. 
In all other cases, the fact that a network is uncongested 
strongly suggests both that any prioritization is commercially 
reasonable and that such prioritization is not adversely affecting 
other connections. 
Because a great portion of a given connection’s performance is 
determined by circumstances outside the control of a given network 
operator (i.e., by off-net factors), competitive benchmarking of 
services’ on-net performance is an important tool in understanding 
how, or whether, any on-net prioritization is affecting a given 
service’s performance. For instance, as discussed above, the 
performance characteristics of MPEG-DASH, the protocol currently 
used by firms like Netflix to deliver streaming video, are not yet well 
understood. Initial research suggests that MPEG-DASH in particular 
has poor performance characteristics that are attributable to its design 
and interaction with TCP’s congestion-control mechanisms—and 
that are outside of the control of a given network operator.204  
Operationalizing this factor, in evaluating whether 
prioritization unreasonably affects a given service, the Commission 
should look to the performance of other similar services. If other 
similar services are able to operate well on a given network, this 
strongly suggests that any performance issues are related to off-net 
factors. Even in the absence of such positive comparisons, the 
Commission should be careful to look at the underlying technical 
mechanisms and state of relevant research in attributing any 
performance difficulties to on-net versus off-net factors.  
Related to this point, the earlier discussion of statistical 
multiplexing leads to a final observation: Services that consume a 
statistically disproportionate amount of the shared network resource 
(e.g., available capacity) impose a negative externality upon all other 
users and uses of that resource. Independent from any fees for 
prioritization, such users should reasonably be expected to pay a 
premium for their disproportionate use of the resource. A basic 
premise of the Internet is that aggregation of underutilized resources 
creates a more efficient aggregate resource. This aggregation is 
                                                     
 204. See Mansy, Ver Steeg & Ammar, supra note 194, at 214-15. 
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accomplished by statistical multiplexing. But when a single service 
uses a disproportionate share of the network resource, the 
opportunistic sharing enabled by statistical multiplexing (i.e., 
allowing one service to use another service’s excess capacity) 
becomes free-riding instead. Such conduct is more harmful to the 
Internet’s future as an innovative platform than prioritization or other 
concerns raised in the NPRM; to whatever extent the Commission 
takes action to police conduct such as prioritization, similar attention 
should be paid to services that make uncompensated disproportionate 
use of the network resource. 
CONCLUSION 
The normative justification for net neutrality is that it promotes 
innovation. And, to the extent it relies on the “virtuous circle” theory 
to justify its regulatory intervention, the FCC premises its Open 
Internet rules on the belief that such innovation will ultimately drive 
investment in the deployment of new advanced telecommunications 
services. While both of these beliefs are likely true in many cases, 
they are also likely not true in others. The relationship between net 
neutrality and innovation is more complicated than this simple 
story—the story guiding the FCC’s approach to broadband 
regulation—of innovation tells.  
This Article has done two things beyond providing a general 
overview of the Commission’s regulatory efforts in this area. First, it 
has discussed three of the judicial challenges that the Commission’s 
Open Internet order is likely to face. There are many other 
challenges that are being raised against the Order, but the three 
discussed here either present issues of broader impact than just the 
Order, so are likely to attract the eventual attention of the Supreme 
Court, or potentially undermine the Commission’s basic theory of 
Open Internet regulation. The first of these challenges is that the 
Commission doesn’t have statutory authority to adopt what FCC 
Chairman Wheeler has repeatedly called “the most important 
network ever”—or, to frame it in terms of broader interest, that the 
courts expect Congress to speak clearly in assigning an agency such 
broad authority. The second challenge is that reclassification of 
Internet access from a Title I to a Title II service raises heightened 
procedural requirements under Fox I due to changed factual settings 
or reliance interest engendered by the prior classification. This 
concern also raises—and this Article briefly discusses—a nexus of 
potential First and Fifth Amendment concerns as well as questions 
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about the definition of common carriers. And the third challenge is 
that the Order is arbitrary and capricious in its use of and failure to 
address comments introduced into the record. This discussion is 
particularly important because, as addressed in the final Part of the 
paper, there is substantial literature that urges strongly against the 
sort of rules the Commission adopted in the Open Internet Order. 
The second thing that this Article did was discuss that extensive 
literature. Any action undertaken by the Commission must be based, 
first and foremost, on a sound understanding of the underlying 
technology, lest the Commission risk both acting in contravention of 
its legal mandate and significantly undermining the efficient 
operation of the Internet. Unfortunately, the Open Internet Order 
fails this test. The relationship between “openness” as in input, on 
the one hand, and various outputs such as innovation, competition, 
and consumer welfare, on the other, has been extensively studied in 
various literatures. This work consistently concludes that there is no 
one-size-fits-all way to promote innovation. “Openness” may be 
positively, negatively, or uncorrelated with these outcomes. This 
suggests that any effort to implement strict, ex ante “openness” 
requirements on the Internet is—almost by definition—arbitrary and 
capricious. 

